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THE PARADOXICAL IMPACT
OF SCALIA’S CAMPAIGN AGAINST
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Stuart Minor Benjamin & Kristen M. Renberg†
Beginning in 1985, Judge and then Justice Antonin Scalia
advocated forcefully against the use of legislative history in
statutory interpretation. Justice Scalia’s position, in line with
his textualism, was that legislative history was irrelevant and
judges should avoid invoking it. Reactions to his attacks
among Justices and prominent circuit judges had an ideological quality, with greater support from ideological conservatives. In this Article, we consider the role that political party
and timing of judicial nomination played in circuit judges’ use
of legislative history. Specifically, we hypothesize that Republican circuit judges were more likely to respond to the attacks
on legislative history than their Democratic counterparts, and
that judges who joined the bench during or after these attacks
were more likely to be influenced than their counterparts who
were appointed before the attacks. Utilizing a dataset containing all published federal appellate court majority opinions
between 1965 and 2011 (more than 240,000 opinions), we
find that, for both hypotheses, the judges whom we would
expect to be more influenced by the attacks on legislative history were in fact less likely than their counterparts to cite
statements from floor debates or committee hearings, traditionally regarded as among the least reliable forms of legislative history. But they were more likely than their counterparts
to cite committee reports, traditionally regarded as the most
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reliable form of legislative history. The attacks on legislative
history thus seem to have had the effect of pushing judges
who might be expected to be influenced to (re)examine their
treatment of legislative history but not (as Scalia had advocated) to avoid citing it. Instead, they adopted what had been
the consensus approach for most of the twentieth century.
Scalia influenced, but he did not persuade.
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INTRODUCTION
I think [Justice Scalia] is going to go down as one of the most
important, most historic figures in the Court, and . . . I think
the primary reason for that is that Justice Scalia has taught
everybody how to do statutory interpretation differently, and
I really do mean pretty much taught everybody. You know
there’s that classic phrase that we’re all realists now. Well I
think we’re all textualists now in a way that just was not
remotely true when Justice Scalia joined the bench.
Justice Elena Kagan1
1
The 2015 Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice Elena Kagan on the Reading of Statutes, HARV. L. TODAY at 7:58 (Nov. 17, 2015), http://today.law.harvard.edu/in-scalia-lecture-kagan-discusses-statutory-interpretation
[https://perma.cc/8AXR-5Z62]; see also Justice Elena Kagan on Supreme Court
and Constitutional Law: McCormick Lecture at the University of Arizona Rogers
College of Law, C-SPAN at 20:11 (Aug. 31, 2016), https://www.c-span.org/video/
?414445-1/justice-elena-kagan-supreme-court-constitutional-law [https://
perma.cc/F5BM-YQKZ] (“I think [Scalia’s] truly long-lasting legacy is in the area
of statutory interpretation, where he changed the way everybody does statutory
interpretation. It’s not just that he had his own distinctive method of interpretation. He really just moved the whole field.”); Jonathan R. Siegel, Textualism and
Contextualism in Administrative Law, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1023, 1057 (1998)
(“[E]veryone must acknowledge the valuable and very significant achievement of
Justice Scalia in recalling the attention of the legal community to the importance
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The role of legislative history is a central issue in statutory
interpretation. Its use is the central methodological divide between textualists and purposivists or intentionalists.2 Until
the 1970s, there was a fairly broad consensus in the U.S. Supreme Court (and among scholars) that it is appropriate for
courts to utilize legislative history in interpreting statutes, and
that there is a hierarchy of legislative history in terms of reliability, reflecting the degree to which that legislative history is
likely to shed light on Congress’s purpose in enacting the stat-

of text in statutory interpretation. In a significant sense, we are all textualists
now. The days when lawyers could ‘routinely . . . make no distinction between
words in the text of a statute and words in its legislative history’ are surely over.
Justice Scalia has very substantially affected the way scholars and judges think
about statutory interpretation.”) (quoting ANTONIN SCALIA, Common-Law Courts in
a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the
Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 31 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997)); Marjorie O. Rendell, 2003—A Year of Discovery: Cybergenics and Plain Meaning in Bankruptcy Cases, 49 VILL. L. REV. 887,
887 (2004) (beginning her article, written in her capacity as a circuit judge, by
flatly stating that “[w]e are all textualists now.”); Diarmuid O’Scannlain, “We Are
All Textualists Now”: The Legacy of Justice Antonin Scalia, 91 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
303, 304 (2017) (circuit judge stating that we are all textualists now because of
Scalia).
Interestingly, Kagan attended law school from 1983 to 1986, so Scalia’s attacks on legislative history began while she was in her last year of law school. See
infra notes 19–25 and accompanying text (describing the rise of those attacks).
2
See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Statutory Interpretations and the Therapy of the
Obvious, 68 VAND. L. REV. 159, 159–60 (2015) (noting “Justice Antonin Scalia’s
campaign to displace intentionalist or purposivist approaches to interpretation
with what has come to be called ‘textualism,’ and his related effort to rule out
reliance on legislative history.”); Andrew Tutt, Fifty Shades of Textualism, 29 J.L.
& POL. 309, 324 (2014) (noting this distinction).
As the names suggest, textualism looks only to statutory text, purposivism
focuses on statutory purpose, and intentionalism focuses on legislative intent.
See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 324 (1990) (“The three main theories today
emphasize (1) the actual or presumed intent of the legislature enacting the statute
(‘intentionalism’); (2) the actual or presumed purpose of the statute (‘purposivism’
or ‘modified intentionalism’); and (3) the literal commands of the statutory text
(‘textualism’).”). The key for our purposes is that purposivists and intentionalists
readily look to legislative history. See Nancy Staudt et al., Judging Statutes:
Interpretive Regimes, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1909, 1938 n.113 (2005) (“Both an
intentionalist and a purposivist will consult legislative history in making a determination.”). Textualists, and in particular Justice Scalia’s brand of textualism,
avoids invocation of legislative history. See Rubin, supra note 2; infra notes
20–30 and accompanying text; infra note 57.
Purposivism and intentionalism are sometimes lumped together, with intentionalism sometimes treated as a form of purposivism and purposivism sometimes treated as a form of intentionalism. Nothing turns on this categorization for
our purposes, since both entail looking to legislative history. As a convenient
shorthand, we will refer to purposivism to encompass purposivism and
intentionalism.
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ute.3 That consensus about legislative history hierarchy
eroded in the 1970s, as courts increasingly cited statements
from floor debates and committee hearings, which had been
considered among the least reliable forms of legislative
history.4
Starting in the mid-1980s, several prominent Republican
federal appellate judges expressed doubts about courts’ relying
on any legislative history. Most prominent among these was
D.C. Circuit Judge and then Justice Antonin Scalia.5 His
prominence probably reflected his higher visibility (he was elevated to the Supreme Court in 1986), the relentlessness of his
attacks, and his clever use of language (and thus quotability).
The assault on the use of legislative history thus became associated first and foremost with Scalia, although he was by no
means the only person expressing opposition to its use.6
The attacks on legislative history were the key methodological element of Scalia’s and others’ attacks on purposivism in
statutory interpretation. That is, their push against legislative
history was part of their push against purposivism and in favor
of textualism: courts should focus on the text that Congress
actually enacted and should not try to determine Congress’s
underlying purpose. Tools like legislative history were not part
of the text and thus should not be consulted.7
Textualism versus purposivism, and in particular the debate over the legitimacy of the use of legislative history, has
been the biggest debate in statutory construction since the
mid-1980s. Indeed, it is fair to say that it has been the statutory construction debate in the years since Scalia started his
3

See infra notes 11–14 and accompanying text.
The category of statements from floor debates encompasses all such statements, including revised and extended remarks (which are not actually spoken on
the floor but instead are inserted into the record). Revised and extended remarks
are not commonly cited, but we included them for completeness.
More generally, one can think of the category of “statements from floor debates and committee hearings” as all congressional debate. And we refer to citations to “floor debates or committee hearings” to highlight that an opinion need
cite only a floor debate or a committee hearing to be included in this category.
5
See Nicholas R. Parrillo, Leviathan and Interpretive Revolution: The Administrative State, the Judiciary, and the Rise of Legislative History, 1890–1950, 123
YALE L.J. 266, 269 (2013) (“In the 1980s, legislative history was uncontroversial
and very common. . . . Beginning in the late 1980s, however, a movement of
judges and lawyers—led by Antonin Scalia—began to argue that this familiar
interpretive resource was pernicious and should be banished from the judicial
system.”).
6
As we discuss below, see infra note 31 and accompanying text, in this
article we will often refer to Scalia as a convenient shorthand for Scalia and
others.
7
See infra notes 36–39 and accompanying text.
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attacks.8 Scalia not only raised the issue, but his attacks, and
the responses to them, dominated all other statutory construction issues. It is not even clear what would be in second place.
The battles over legislative history and over textualism versus purposivism overlapped with ideology. The leaders of the
movement against legislative history and purposivism (and in
favor of textualism) were ideological conservatives.9 The leading judicial defenders of legislative history and purposivism
(and against textualism) were ideological liberals.10
In this Article, we consider circuit judges’ reactions to the
advocacy of textualism and the concomitant attacks on legislative history by testing two hypotheses: whether Republican circuit judges were more responsive to the attacks on legislative
history than were their Democratic counterparts, and whether
judges who started serving during the Reagan Administration
or thereafter were more responsive to the attacks than were
their earlier-appointed counterparts (who would have been deciding statutory interpretation cases well before Scalia started
attacking the use of legislative history). To determine responsiveness we compare citations to legislative history, because
the more a judge cites legislative history, the less that judge is
following Scalia’s lead. We find that, for both hypotheses, the
judges whom we would expect to be more hostile to legislative
history were in fact less likely than their counterparts to cite
floor statements or committee hearings, which had been regarded as among the least reliable forms of legislative history.
But they were actually more likely than their counterparts to
cite committee reports, which had been regarded as the most
reliable form of legislative history. Thus the judges whom we
expect to be more likely to be influenced by attacks on legislative history were in fact more influenced by them. But the
nature of that influence was, from Scalia’s standpoint, paradoxical: the attacks on legislative history seem to have had the
effect of pushing Republican and post-Reagan judges to
(re)examine their approach to legislative history but not to
avoid its use and thus not to accept Scalia’s approach. Instead, they ended up adopting what had been the consensus
8
Many thousands of pages of judicial opinions, law review articles, and
books have been devoted to this debate. For a sample, see sources supra notes
1–2, infra notes 26–29, 33–34, and 52–72.
9
See infra notes 21–23, 41–42 and accompanying text.
10
See infra notes 33–35, 49–52 and accompanying text; see also Comm’r of
Internal Revenue v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739–43 (1989) (majority opinion by
Justice Stevens with an extensive discussion of legislative history in light of statutory ambiguity; Scalia joined all but the discussion of legislative history).
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approach until the 1970s, and that defenders of legislative history in the mid-1980s and thereafter had advocated as an alternative to Scalia’s categorical opposition.
Part I of this Article discusses the approaches to legislative
history that preceded the attacks on its use and the development of those attacks. Part II considers the ideological valence
of the attacks on legislative history and concomitant support
for textualism. This Part lays out our hypotheses regarding
differences based on the political party of the appointing President and a judge’s appointment before Ronald Reagan became
President. Part III lays out the data and measures we use to
test our hypotheses. Part IV presents and discusses our
results.
We find that Scalia’s influence was more nuanced and less
complete than he wanted, and also less than our hypotheses
predicted: after Scalia’s attacks, Republican circuit judges became less likely to cite statements from floor debates or committee hearings than their Democratic counterparts, and
judges appointed by Reagan or later Presidents (regardless of
party) became less likely to cite such statements than their
earlier-appointed counterparts. But the Republican and laterappointed judges became more likely than their counterparts
to cite committee reports. Part V discusses the implications of
our results.
I
THE JUDICIAL USE OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, AND
ATTACKS ON IT
For most of the twentieth century, there was a fairly broad
consensus in the U.S. Supreme Court (and among scholars)
that it is appropriate for courts to utilize legislative history in
interpreting statutes, and that there is a hierarchy of legislative
history in terms of reliability, reflecting the degree to which that
legislative history is likely to shed light on congressional intent.
The Supreme Court in 1921 flatly stated that
By repeated decisions of this court it has come to be well
established that the debates in Congress expressive of the
views and motives of individual members are not a safe
guide, and hence may not be resorted to, in ascertaining the
meaning and purpose of the law-making body. But reports of
committees of House or Senate stand upon a more solid footing, and may be regarded as an exposition of the legislative
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intent in a case where otherwise the meaning of a statute is
obscure.11

The Court had similar pronouncements from the late nineteenth century to the mid-1980s, relying on committee reports
and presenting them as the most reliable form of legislative
history, and abjuring reliance on floor statements on the
grounds that they are among the least reliable.12 Legal com11
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 474 (1921) (citations
omitted).
12
See Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 (1984) (“In surveying legislative history we have repeatedly stated that the authoritative source for finding the
Legislature’s intent lies in the Committee Reports on the bill, which ‘represen[t]
the considered and collective understanding of those Congressmen involved in
drafting and studying proposed legislation.’ We have eschewed reliance on the
passing comments of one Member, and casual statements from the floor debates.”) (citations omitted); Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969) (“A committee
report represents the considered and collective understanding of those Congressmen involved in drafting and studying proposed legislation. Floor debates reflect
at best the understanding of individual Congressmen. It would take extensive and
thoughtful debate to detract from the plain thrust of a committee report.”); United
States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 385 (1968) (declining to put any weight on floor
statements, and stating that “if we were to examine legislative purpose in the
instant case, we would be obliged to consider not only these statements but also
the more authoritative reports of the Senate and House Armed Services Committees”); Lapina v. Williams, 232 U.S. 78, 90 (1914) (“Counsel for petitioner cites the
debates in Congress as indicating that the act was not understood to refer to any
others than immigrants. But the unreliability of such debates as a source from
which to discover the meaning of the language employed in an act of Congress has
been frequently pointed out, and we are not disposed to go beyond the reports of
the committees.”) (citations omitted); Binns v. United States, 194 U.S. 486, 495
(1904) (stating that courts should not consult congressional debates but could
consider legislative reports to “determin[e] the scope of statutes passed on the
strength of such reports”); see also Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43 n.7
(1986) (plurality opinion) (“We have repeatedly recognized that the authoritative
source for legislative intent lies in the Committee Reports on the bill.”); Chrysler
Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 310–11 (1979) (relying on a committee report and
stating that “[t]he remarks of a single legislator, even the sponsor, are not controlling in analyzing legislative history”); Gay v. Ruff, 292 U.S. 25, 38 (1934) (“The
report of the Judiciary Committee of the House which recommended the adoption
of the 1916 amendment establishes that such was the sole purpose of Congress.”); United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 318 (1897)
(noting “a general acquiescence in the doctrine that debates in congress are not
appropriate sources of information from which to discover the meaning of the
language of a statute passed by that body”).
These legislative history sources are longstanding. The Congressional Globe
began publishing verbatim transcripts of floor debates in 1850. See Parrillo,
supra note 5, at 272. The Globe was succeeded by the Congressional Record in
1873, and by the 46th Congress (1879-81) it ran to 10,000 pages. Id. As for
committee reports, the House made them mandatory in 1880, and the Senate
issued them on most bills by 1900. Id. Finally, congressional committees began
publishing their hearings in the nineteenth century, and by 1910, 500–650 hearing transcripts were published per year. See id. As Parrillo also notes, through
the middle of the twentieth century those materials were often difficult to gather
for those who did not have access to an excellent library, which gave a huge
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mentators in this period recognized this hierarchy as well.13 As
commentators noted, Senators and Representatives often
looked to conference and committee reports to understand the
bill they were voting on.14
Starting around 1970, citations to legislative history increased dramatically in the Supreme Court and in circuit
courts (and particularly in the D.C. Circuit, which hears a disproportionate share of challenges to actions by administrative
advantage to government agencies in marshaling legislative history materials during the New Deal and World War II. See id. at 321–38.
13
See REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 155
(1975) (“Materials in hearings and floor debates are so heterogeneous and fragmentary and so influenced by the tactics of promoting enactment that they have
almost no credibility for the purposes of later interpretation.”); id. at 158 (“Much
more reliable are the explanations, in committee or conference reports, of the
purposes behind proposed legislation. These are some of the very rare kinds of
legislative history that can make a respectable showing on the scale of reliability.”); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 636
(1990) (presenting a hierarchy of legislative history sources from most to least
authoritative, with committee reports as the most authoritative and floor and
hearing colloquy considerably less authoritative); George A. Costello, Average
Voting Members and Other “Benign Fictions”: The Relative Reliability of Committee
Reports, Floor Debates, and Other Sources of Legislative History, 39 DUKE L.J. 39,
40–41 (1990) (discussing “the hierarchy courts have established among the principal sources of legislative history (committee reports have been considered the
most reliable, floor debates and hearings less so).”); William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Philip P. Frickey, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION
OF PUBLIC POLICY 709, 717 (1st ed. 1988) (“Most scholars and judges agree that
committee reports should be considered as authoritative legislative history and
should be given great weight . . . . Unlike statements from committee reports,
statements made during committee hearings and floor debates have traditionally
been given very little weight by courts and commentators.”); JAMES WILLARD HURST,
DEALING WITH STATUTES 42, 43 (1982) (contrasting the Congressional Record with
committee reports, and noting of the latter: “Most influential are the reports of the
legislative committees that considered the bill that became the statute. It is an
appropriate emphasis, because the committee is normally the workplace in which
members have hammered out the particular content of the measure.”); Elizabeth
A. McNellie, The Use of Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Popularly Enacted
Legislation, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 162–63 (1989) (“Committee hearings are probably the lowest form of extrinsic aid in the hierarchy of the traditional model.
Generally, hearings are relegated to this role because of the extreme likelihood
that no one other than the committee itself will hear the testimony and because it
is assumed that any relevant statements will be reflected in the committee report.”). More recent sources agree. See, e.g., ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES 38 (2014) (contrasting committee reports and conference committee reports,
which are “authoritative materials,” with other forms of legislative history like
floor statements).
14
See, e.g., Forrest Maltzman & Charles R. Shipan, Change, Continuity, and
the Evolution of the Law, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 252, 260 (2008) (noting that the
legislative meaning of laws to interest groups and legislators is often based on the
agreements reached in conference reports); Alexander Bolton & Sharece Thrower,
Legislative Capacity and Executive Unilateralism, 60 AM. J. POL. SCI. 649, 652–54
(2016) (noting the limited time and resources for members of Congress and their
staff and their reliance on committee reports).
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agencies).15 And the composition of legislative history citations
changed: courts became much more likely to cite statements
from floor debates or committee hearings. As we noted above,
such statements had been regarded as among the least reliable
forms of legislative history. Particularly relevant for our purposes, our data in this Article demonstrate (see Figure 1) that
federal appellate court citations to these statements increased
very dramatically in the 1970s through the early 1980s. Thus,
in this period, the consensus hierarchy that had existed for
most of the twentieth century lost some of its force. And, more
generally, reliance on legislative history exploded.
A 1982 article containing the first statistical analysis of the
Supreme Court’s use of legislative history canvassed the literature on legislative history and concluded that there was “almost absolute acceptance” of legislative history, stating flatly
that “[w]e can safely assume now, that the doubts and vacillations of the past in the adequate use of [legislative history] have
vanished.”16 This position accurately reflected both scholarly
commentary and judicial practice. Indeed, some courts emphasized the importance of legislative history in interpreting a
statute. Notable in this regard is a major Supreme Court case
15
See David S. Law & David Zaring, Law Versus Ideology: The Supreme Court
and the Use of Legislative History, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1653, 1716 fig.5 (2010)
(showing an increase in Supreme Court citations to legislative history starting in
1970 and a decline starting in the mid-1980s); Glenn Bridgman, One of These
Things Is Not Like the Others: Legislative History in the U.S. Courts of Appeal, YALE
STUDENT PRIZE PAPERS 1, 9, 25–27, 34 (2012) (presenting evidence of a dramatic
increase of Supreme Court and federal appellate citations to legislative history
starting around 1970 and a decrease starting in the mid-1980s and noting that “a
greater percentage of the cases on the D.C. Circuit’s docket involve statutory
interpretation, and the D.C. Circuit has correspondingly more opportunities to
cite legislative history.”); Parrillo, supra note 5, at 389–90 (discussing the increase
in Supreme Court and federal appellate court citations to legislative history from
the early 1970s through the early 1980s and the drop thereafter, and noting that
the willingness to review statutes and agency actions may have become more
pronounced in the D.C. Circuit in the early 1970s as compared to other judicial
circuit, as “a rising disenchantment with bureaucracy led the judiciary and especially the D.C. Circuit to become far more independent, willful, and aggressive in
reviewing the actions of agencies than in the preceding generation”).
16
Jorge L. Carro & Andrew R. Brann, The U.S. Supreme Court and the Use of
Legislative Histories: A Statistical Analysis, 22 JURIMETRICS 294, 296–97 (1982);
see also HURST, supra note 13, at 42 (“The twentieth-century approach is to be
prepared and willing to give weight to particular legislative history.”); Patricia M.
Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme
Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 197–98 (1983) (“Not once last Term was the
Supreme Court sufficiently confident of the clarity of statutory language not to
double check its meaning with the legislative history. The language of ‘plain
meaning’ lingers on in Court opinions, but its spirit is gone. In its application of
the plain meaning rule, the Court now shifts onto legislative history the burden of
proving that the words do not mean what they appear to say.”).
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from 1971, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, in
which the majority, in interpreting a statute, stated: “The legislative history of [the statutes] is ambiguous. . . . Because of this
ambiguity it is clear that we must look primarily to the statutes
themselves to find the legislative intent.”17 Among the many
judges who invoked legislative history in the early 1980s was
then-Judge Scalia.18
As it turned out, the 1982 article was published shortly
before Scalia and other judges started arguing that the courts
were using legislative history too profligately.19 As we noted
17
401 U.S. 402, 412 n.29 (1971). In one of his attacks on the use of legislative history, Scalia highlighted similar language from a more recent brief:
I respectfully decline to join [the majority’s legislative history] discussion, however, because it is natural for the bar to believe that the
juridical importance of such material matches its prominence in our
opinions—thus producing a legal culture in which, when counsel
arguing before us assert that “Congress has said” something, they
now frequently mean, by “Congress,” a committee report; and in
which it was not beyond the pale for a recent brief to say the following: “Unfortunately, the legislative debates are not helpful. Thus,
we turn to the other guidepost in this difficult area, statutory
language.”
Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 529–30 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 24, Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491
U.S. 701 (1989) (No. 87–2084)).
18
See, e.g., Asociacion de Reclamantes v. United Mexican States, 735 F.2d
1517, 1524 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“The legislative history makes clear that for the
exception of § 1605(a)(5) to apply ‘the tortious act or omission must occur within
the jurisdiction of the United States.’”) (quoting a House report); Toney v. Block,
705 F.2d 1364, 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Tamm, J., concurring) (“The legislative
history of Title VII clearly shows that Congress’ intent in providing for awards of
back pay to successful plaintiffs was to provide a ‘make whole’ remedy.”) (quoting
the Congressional Record), abrogated by Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S.
228 (1989); Int’l Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Donovan, 746 F.2d 855, 864 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“While we would not
normally interpret the reference to include the section prior to its amendment, the
language is at least susceptible of that interpretation. And the legislative history
indicates this is precisely what was meant.”); Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Ruckelshaus,
747 F.2d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (stating that “[f]ar from contradicting [the text’s]
ordinary meaning, both the surrounding text of the statute and its legislative
history tend to confirm it,” and then discussing legislative history); Simmons v.
ICC, 716 F.2d 40, 44 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“In our view, the legislative history of the
Act of January 2, 1975, suggests, like its text, that in all respects not explicitly
stated the ICC is to be treated like other agencies subject to the Hobbs Act.”);
Aluminum Co. of Am. v. ICC, 761 F.2d 746, 749 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“The legislative
history of the APA makes it entirely clear (if reason alone does not suffice) that
such a strange result was not intended.”); Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. ICC, 697
F.2d 1146, 1148–52 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (quoting and discussing legislative history at
length); Romero v. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc., 749 F.2d 77, 82–83 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (quoting and discussing legislative history).
19
Even more striking was the timing of Judge Richard Posner’s book THE
FEDERAL COURTS (1985). In it, Posner noted that there had been a debate over
whether judges should ever cite legislative history but characterized it as “now
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above, Scalia’s (and others’) critiques of legislative history were
part and parcel of their advocacy of textualism. As we also
noted, the debate between textualism and purposivism, and
thus the debate over the use of legislative history, had an ideological valence: the leading advocates of applying textualism
and ignoring legislative history were ideologically conservative.
The first prominent judicial opinion articulating misgivings
about the use of legislative history was then-Judge Scalia’s
concurring opinion in Hirschey v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission.20 Scalia’s doubts about legislative history in Hirschey achieved particular prominence because the following
summer he was nominated to the Supreme Court. At his confirmation hearing, no fewer than four Senators commented
(mostly negatively) on his approach to legislative history in Hirschey, and Scalia himself stated that if he “could create the
world anew,” he would get rid of legislative history.21 Other
(mainly Republican) circuit judges also noticed Hirschey and
academic.” Id. at 269. Within months of the book’s publication the debate was no
longer academic.
20
777 F.2d 1, 7–8 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., concurring). Interestingly,
Scalia’s critique in Hirschey was relatively mild in comparison to his blanket
denunciations of legislative history on the Supreme Court, and the subject of his
ire was the majority’s reliance on a House committee report (which conventionally
had been considered to be the most reliable form of legislative history). See id.
Scalia stated: “I frankly doubt that it is ever reasonable to assume that the details,
as opposed to the broad outlines of purpose, set forth in a committee report come
to the attention of, much less are approved by, the house which enacts the
committee’s bill.” Id. (footnote omitted). He expanded on this latter point in a
speech that he gave at many law schools between the fall of 1985 and the spring of
1986, just before his Supreme Court nomination:
As an intermediate federal judge, I can hardly ignore legislative history when I know it will be used by the Supreme Court. . . . I
suppose I would rank most highly legislative history consisting of
amendments defeated on the floor. . . . I suppose next to that would
be extended floor debate—at least in circumstances, which occasionally occur, where the final text is actually being crafted on the
floor. At the bottom of the list I would place—what hitherto seems to
have been placed at the top: the committee report.
Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L.
REV. 423, 442 n.64 (1988) (excerpting this speech).
Thus, then-Judge Scalia would have most squarely rejected invocation of
committee reports. And one of the judges who joined Scalia in his attacks on
legislative history, then-D.C. Circuit Judge Kenneth Starr, adopted a similar view,
stating that “only the record of speeches on the floor of either chamber should be
considered even minimally probative of Congress’s intent . . . [because only] those
remarks have been heard—however superficially—by members of Congress (albeit a minority in most instances).” Kenneth Starr, Observations About the Use of
Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371, 375–76. By contrast, on the Supreme
Court, Scalia generally rejected invocation of any legislative history. See infra
notes 24–25 and accompanying text; infra note 57.
21
Nomination of Judge Antonin Scalia, to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th
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echoed its concerns. The first was Judge Alex Kozinski of the
Ninth Circuit, who in a 1986 concurrence emphasized that
“Judge (now Justice) Scalia has persuasively warned against
relying on detailed discussions in legislative reports,” and folCong. 105–06 (1986); Id. at 65–68, 74–75, 105–07 (comments of Senators
Grassley, Heflin, Simon, and Mathias, and Scalia statement).
Following up on a suggestion from Abbe Gluck, we asked Duke Research
Librarian Wickliffe Shreve to review the transcripts of the nomination hearings of
other Justices for questions about legislative history in statutory interpretation.
In pre-Scalia Senate Supreme Court confirmation hearings, he found only one
question about the use of legislative history in statutory interpretation (though
the transcription of some hearings made it hard to do searches on them, so it is
possible that he missed a question in other hearings): then-Judge O’Connor was
asked “What is your approach in construing specific statutes? Would you feel
constrained by the language of the statute and the legislative history or would you
feel empowered to imply or create a consensus that might not have existed in the
legislative branch?” The Nomination of Sandra Day O’Connor of Arizona to Serve
as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 134 (1981).
After Scalia joined the Court, by contrast, nominees were frequently asked for
their views about the use of legislative history in statutory interpretation, and the
questioning Senator often invoked Scalia by name. See, e.g., Nomination of Judge
Clarence Thomas to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States:
Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Part 1, 102d Cong. 213 (1991)
(“Judge Scalia testified here, and has practiced it as a Justice, that in looking at
history, he is not going to look to the committee reports, he is not going to look to
congressional debate, he is going to look at the statute and just determine congressional intent from the language of the statute. Is that where you are going to
get congressional intent?”); Nomination of David H. Souter to Be Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 101st Cong. 130–31 (1990) (“[T]o what extent do you believe the legislative history should be taken into consideration, if you were sitting on the Supreme
Court interpreting a statute passed by the Congress?”);Nomination of Stephen G.
Breyer to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States:
Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 170 (1994) (“You and I,
I think, share a similar view on the use of legislative history in the interpretation of
statutes, unlike, for instance, the way I view Justice Scalia not wanting to look at
legislative history. You, have written Law Review articles about it, and from a
reading of your cases, I can also see that you are willing to rely on legislative
history.”); Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
103d Cong. 223–25 (1993) (“There are jurists who argue that the Court should
disregard the tradition of looking to the legislative history of a law to determine
how Congress intended that it be executed, and under this view they should look
to the language in the four corners of the statute to resolve any ambiguities and
not to committee reports, floor speeches, or any other items that might accompany a bill through the legislative process. Now, the proponents argue, as one has
said, that ‘judicial abdication to a fictitious legislative intent’ would occur were
you to look for congressional intent, and that legislative history itself is ‘the last
hope of lost interpretive causes.’ Do you agree with that statement?”) (quoting
Scalia; the Senator later stated, “For the benefit of my colleagues, the language
that I quoted earlier, about judicial abdication to a fictitious legislative intent, that
was Justice Scalia who articulated that position.” Justice Ginsburg drily (or
perhaps drolly) responded “I am well aware of his position.”). Interestingly, all
these nominees responded that legislative history is an appropriate source.
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lowed with a block quote from Scalia’s opinion in Hirschey and
a discussion of it.22 Soon other circuit judges followed Scalia’s
lead, citing Hirschey.23
Scalia was just getting started. In a series of concurring
and dissenting opinions in his first few years on the Supreme
Court, Scalia repeatedly criticized the use of legislative history.24 He declined to join majority opinions because they in22
Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F.2d 1539, 1559 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc)
(Kozinski, J., concurring in the judgment).
23
See Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1054–55 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(Ruth Bader Ginsburg, J.) (citing Scalia’s concurrence in Hirschey in stating that
“[c]ommittee reports, we remind, do not embody the law. Congress, as Judge
Scalia recently noted, votes on the statutory words, not on different expressions
packaged in committee reports”), aff’d by equally divided Court, 484 U.S. 1 (1987);
ACLU v. FCC, 823 F.2d 1554, 1583 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Starr, J., dissenting) (stating
that “[w]e in the judiciary have become shamelessly profligate and unthinking in
our use of legislative history” and citing Scalia’s concurrence in Hirschey); In re
Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1343 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.) (criticizing reliance
on legislative history and invoking Scalia’s concurrence in Hirschey). In contrast
to other early supporters of Scalia’s Hirschey concurrence, Judge (and later Justice) Ruth Bader Ginsburg was a Democratic judge. But her opinion in Abourezk
turned out not to presage support for his attacks on legislative history. See infra
note 41.
24
See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452–55 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Judges interpret laws rather than reconstruct legislators’ intentions.
Where the language of those laws is clear, we are not free to replace it with an
unenacted legislative intent.”); Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 191–92
(1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Committee reports, floor speeches, and even colloquies between Congressmen, are frail substitutes for bicameral vote upon the text
of a law and its presentment to the President.”) (citation omitted); United States v.
Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 344–46 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“It should not be
possible, or at least should not be easy, to be sure of obtaining a particular result
in this Court without making that result apparent on the face of the bill which
both Houses consider and vote upon, which the President approves, and which, if
it becomes law, the people must obey. I think we have an obligation to conduct
our exegesis in a fashion which fosters that democratic process.”).
Brudney and Ditslear choose 1986 as their cut-off point because of Scalia’s
ascension to the Court in that year, noting that “[u]pon becoming a Justice in the
1986 Term, Justice Scalia began to express relentless opposition to colleagues’
use of legislative history.” James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal Justices’
Reliance on Legislative History: Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia Effect, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 117, 161 (2008). As they further note (in a section entitled
“Justice Scalia’s Line in the Sand”):
During his first three terms on the Court, Justice Scalia authored a
series of separate opinions—including at least eight concurring in
the Court’s judgment—in which he expressly attacked or questioned the majority’s reliance on legislative history. In these separate writings, Scalia insisted that the Court should not use
legislative history to confirm or reinforce the plain meaning of text,
that legislative history is very likely to be generated for strategic or
insincere reasons, and that in any event it is highly unreliable. He
also asserted on several occasions that courts must discover a statute’s purpose or intent only from analyzing the text and not from the
vagaries of a legislative record drafted or understood by, at best,
small subgroups of members.
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voked legislative history.25 Other Justices, most notably
Justice Clarence Thomas, sometimes joined him in declining to
join opinions that cited legislative history, but no other Justice
categorically rejected legislative history the way Scalia did.26
Scalia’s lack of full adherents in the Supreme Court meant
that his attacks on legislative history never achieved a majority
in the Court for broadly rejecting legislative history.27 But his
Id. (footnotes omitted).
25
See Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98–99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“It is neither compatible with our judicial responsibility of assuring reasoned, consistent, and effective application of the statutes of the United States,
nor conducive to a genuine effectuation of congressional intent, to give legislative
force to each snippet of analysis, and even every case citation, in committee
reports that are increasingly unreliable evidence of what the voting Members of
Congress actually had in mind.”). In 1997, he even pointedly refused to join a
footnote (although he joined everything else in the majority opinion) that merely
explained why “[w]e give no weight to the legislative history[.]” See Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 955 n.† (1997) (noting that Scalia joined the
entire majority opinion except footnote 4, which contained the explanation for the
Court’s refusal to give weight to the legislative history).
In a few cases (mainly in his first years at the Court), Scalia did cite legislative
history. See United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 444 (1988) (Scalia, J.) (citing a
Senate report); Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 564 (1988) (Scalia, J.) (citing a
conference report). So, though his citations to legislative history were rare, they
did exist. Nonetheless, and unsurprisingly, given his many broadsides against
invocation of legislative history, Scalia’s position quickly came to be associated
with the rejection of its invocation. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 20, at 423
(criticizing “Justice Scalia’s argument that legislative intent should be considered
irrelevant even when it can be determined.”); The Supreme Court, 1988 Term—
Leading Cases, 103 HARV. L. REV. 320, 323 n. 28 (1989) (“As an analytical matter,
Justice Scalia rejects reliance on legislative history as a means of interpreting
statutes.”); supra note 2; infra notes 206–30. The broader point for our purposes
is that the more a court cites legislative history, the less it is following Scalia. See
infra note 57 and accompanying text.
26
See John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113,
146–47 n.169 (2011) (“Justice Scalia has expressed that view in a number of wellknown separate opinions declining to join opinions of the Court that relied on
legislative history. Justice Thomas has not taken the same categorical stance
against legislative history that Justice Scalia has. From time to time, however,
Justice Thomas will decline to join an opinion of the Court simply because of its
citation on legislative history.” (internal citations omitted)); Jonathan R. Siegel,
Judicial Interpretation in the Cost-Benefit Crucible, 92 MINN. L. REV. 387, 408–09,
409 n.158 (2007) (“For nearly twenty years now, Justice Scalia has engaged in a
sustained campaign against reliance on legislative history, and some other judges
have signed on. . . . Justice Thomas, for example, although not as doctrinaire
about the matter as Justice Scalia, has occasionally joined him in rejecting the
validity of reliance on legislative history.” (footnotes omitted)).
27
See Jonathan R. Siegel, The Legacy of Justice Scalia and His Textualist
Ideal, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 857, 858 (2017) (footnotes omitted):
Although Justice Scalia’s textualist campaign had tremendous influence, it never achieved its final victory. Notwithstanding all the
time and energy he devoted to promoting textualism, Justice Scalia
never persuaded the Supreme Court to abandon reliance on legislative history. The Court never ceased to consult statutory purpose.

R

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\105-4\CRN401.txt

2020]

unknown

Seq: 15

THE PARADOXICAL IMPACT

28-JUL-20

7:36

1037

attacks quickly attracted wide attention. By the end of the
1980s, Scalia’s campaign against the use of legislative history
was well known among judges and scholars.28 He precipitated
Most of all, the Court never adopted Justice Scalia’s fundamental
textualist axiom: “The text is the law.”
See also Stephanie Wald, The Use of Legislative History in Statutory Interpretation
Cases in the 1992 U.S. Supreme Court Term; Scalia Rails but Legislative History
Remains on Track, 23 SW. U. L. REV. 47, 47 (1993) (making the point in the title of
the article).
28
See, e.g., Farber & Frickey, supra note 20, at 437 (“One time-honored
source of legislative intent is the legislative history of the statute. Recently, however, Justice Scalia has roundly attacked the current judicial practice of routinely
considering legislative history.” (footnotes omitted)); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 429–30 (1989) (“In
recent years, the Supreme Court has been divided about the significance of legislative intent and legislative history. The Court has suggested that the question for
interpretation is in fact one of ‘congressional intent,’ and has generally treated
legislative history as a key to the identification of ‘intent.’ Justice Scalia, however,
has expressed considerable doubt about legislative intent in general and legislative history in particular. . . . Above all, Justice Scalia argues the legislative
history was never enacted and is therefore not law.” (footnotes omitted)); Marshall
J. Breger, Introductory Remarks: Conference on Statutory Interpretation, 1987
DUKE L.J. 362, 368–69 (noting Scalia’s opposition to the use of legislative history);
T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20, 38
(1988) (“If one adopts Justice Scalia’s version of textualism, the question becomes
a matter of the sources from which one derives the ‘plain meaning’ of the text.
Scalia’s anti-intentionalism studiously avoids examining legislative history for
such meaning.” (footnotes omitted)); Bruce Fein, Scalia’s Way, 76 ABA J. 38, 38,
41 (1990) (noting that within a few short years of joining the Supreme Court’s
bench, Justice Scalia was able to generate a great amount of attention to his
campaign against invocation of legislative history); Arthur Stock, Justice Scalia’s
Use of Sources in Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation: How Congress Always Loses, 1990 DUKE L.J. 160, 160 (“One source Justice Scalia views as improper is the legislative history compiled by Congress. Though his antipathy
toward legislative history was known before he joined the Supreme Court, over
time he has reasserted this view with renewed vigor.” (footnotes omitted));
Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward
a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1296–97
(1990) (“With increasing frequency and tenor Justice Scalia has challenged the
Court’s traditional approach to interpreting statutes. . . . As part of this textualist
theory, Justice Scalia has targeted the Court’s longstanding reliance on legislative
history to interpret statutes.”); Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of
Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States
Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277, 281 (1990) [hereinafter Wald, Sizzling
Sleeper] (“[T]here now exists a fully articulated and quite aggressive assault in the
Supreme Court on the use of legislative history in construing statutes. The movement’s spiritual leader is Justice Scalia.” (footnote omitted)). Judge Wald summarized Scalia’s attacks as follows:
Justice Scalia’s textualist critique is not quite the same thing as the
old plain meaning rule to which American judges have always given
at least lip service. The plain meaning rule basically articulated a
hierarchy of sources from which to divine legislative intent. Text
came first, and if it is clearly dispositive, then the inquiry is at an
end. But legislative history still has an important role to play as
long as statutory text is not entirely “plain.” According to the textualists, however, the problem with legislative history is not that it is
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a major debate among jurists and scholars on the legitimacy of
courts invoking legislative history in statutory interpretation.29
In just a few years starting in the mid-1980s, Scalia not only
challenged what had seemed to be a settled practice (citing
legislative history) but also, through a combination of prominence and relentlessness, pushed the debate to center stage
among judges and scholars.30
As the discussion above indicates, Scalia was by no means
alone in his campaign against judicial invocation of legislative
less authoritative than statutory language; rather, the textualists
assert that Congress has a voice as a constitutional player only
through its finally enacted statutes, no through any supplementary
explanation thereof, and so legislative history is reduced to the status of “unauthoritative materials.”
Patricia M. Wald, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, Remarks
at U.S. Law Week’s Annual Constitutional Law Conference 7-8 (Sept. 8–9, 1989).
Notably, there are no secondary sources in the Westlaw database containing
“Scalia” in the same sentence as “legislative history” through 1985, but nineteen
such sources through 1987, forty-five through 1988, and seventy-three through
1989. The Westlaw database added publications to its database during this time,
but not nearly at that explosive rate.
29
See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, “Plain Meaning”: Justice Scalia’s Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory Construction, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 401, 401–02
(1994) (discussing the arguments over the permissibility of invocation of legislative history in statutory interpretation); Margaret H. Lemos, The Politics of Statutory Interpretation, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 858–65, 874–77 (2013) (reviewing
ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS (2012)) (same); Manning, supra note 26, at 165–74 (same); Stephen A.
Plass, The Illusion and Allure of Textualism, 40 VILL. L. REV. 93, 101 (1995) (same);
James J. Brudney, Canon Shortfalls and the Virtues of Political Branch Interpretive
Assets, 98 CALIF. L. REV 1199, 1216–24 (2010) (comparing textualist and
purposivist interpretive approaches from the standpoint of legitimacy).
30
In addition to the sources cited above, see Eskridge, supra note 13, at
624–25 (“Justice Scalia’s new textualism is a radical, as opposed to marginal,
critique. It is a bold rethinking of the Court’s role. Partly because of its analytical
boldness, and partly because Justice Scalia is an intellectually aggressive member of the Court, the critique has already changed the Court’s practice in statutory
interpretation cases.”).
Costello began his 1990 article as follows:
The Supreme Court is beginning to reexamine old approaches to
statutory interpretation. With the increased mass and complexity of
federal statutes over the last six decades, courts have turned increasingly to legislative history when faced with issues of statutory
interpretation. The eagerness of many courts to examine congressional materials prompted the joke that under the “American rule,”
examination of statutory text is permissible only when legislative
history is ambiguous. Now underway in the Supreme Court is a
challenge, led by Justice Scalia, to routine reliance on legislative
history as an aid to statutory interpretation. This challenge extends
beyond merely curbing excesses occasioned by overreliance on legislative history. With increasing frequency, the Court emphasizes
statutory language and structure and deemphasizes the role of legislative history.
Costello, supra note 13, at 39.
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history. But his opposition to legislative history was categorical, he was on the Supreme Court, he repeatedly attacked the
use of legislative history, and his language was sharp (and
quotable). Scalia was most closely associated with the campaign against the use of legislative history in deciding cases,
and indeed there is a consensus that Scalia brought the issue
to the fore and led the movement.31 In this Article, we will refer
to Justice Scalia as a convenient shorthand for Scalia and
others in recognition of his status as the leader of the campaign
against the use of legislative history. Relatedly, although it is of
course impossible to know, it seems reasonable to assume that
there would have been a movement against legislative history if
Scalia had never existed.32 That said, without a Supreme
Court Justice forcefully making the case against the invocation
of legislative history, the movement very likely would not have
been as prominent and would not have occasioned the many
judicial opinions and law review articles by judges and professors addressing the issue.
There was a robust response to the attacks, led by prominent ideological liberal judges and law professors who supported the use of legislative history. But Scalia seems to have
changed the terrain from where it had been in the 1970s
through the mid-1980s: those who advocated the use of legislative history stated that of course they began with the statutory
text, and that legislative history should be used carefully but is
especially appropriate when the text is ambiguous.
As to what materials to cite, some who opposed the attacks
on legislative history defended invocation, when appropriate, of
all forms of legislative history. Notably, then-Judge Stephen
Breyer gave a prominent lecture in 1991 defending the use of
all forms of legislative history as possibly relevant to statutory
31

See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text.
Note that the first significant writing in this period that questioned legislative history was by another circuit judge appointed by President Reagan, Judge
Frank Easterbrook, and preceded Hirschey. In a brief 1983 essay, he suggested
that courts too freely relied on legislative history. Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’
Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 544–45 (1983). It did not achieve the prominence of Scalia’s broadsides against legislative history, and by the standards of
the late 1980s its critique was relatively mild—indeed, Easterbrook suggested
that good statutory construction includes looking at legislative history. See id. at
550 (“Statutory construction is an art. Good statutory construction requires the
rarest of skills. The judge must find clues in the structure of the statute, hints in
the legislative history, and combine these with mastery of history, command of
psychology, and sensitivity to nuance to divine how deceased legislators would
have answered unasked questions.”). But it arguably helped to foster the debate
over legislative history.
32
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interpretation.33 More commonly, supporters of legislative history emphasized the hierarchy noted above, stating that ignoring all legislative history was a mistake because committee
reports were reliable even though statements from floor debates and committee hearings generally were not. Scalia’s D.C.
Circuit colleague Judge Abner Mikva, for example, argued in
favor of reliance on committee reports but not floor statements.34 Indeed, some took the opportunity to say that Scalia
had usefully drawn attention to the impropriety of citing unreliable legislative history like floor debates and committee hearings, even as they also argued that Scalia went too far in also
pushing for judges to ignore committee reports.35
Thus the terms of the debate in the mid-1980s and thereafter were that a group of mainly ideologically conservative
judges led by Scalia argued that courts should generally ignore
all forms of legislative history and look only to statutory text,
and a group of mainly ideologically liberal judges and law
professors responded that courts should start with the text but
should invoke legislative history to help flesh out the statutory
language, in particular in cases of textual ambiguity. This latter group tended to emphasize a hierarchy with committee reports as reliable and statements made during floor debates and
committee hearings as relatively unreliable. So the battle lines
were drawn: one group would avoid citing any form of legislative history, and the other group would cite committee reports
but perhaps not to statements from floor debates or committee
hearings.
33
Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes,
65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 847 (1992) (“Although I recognize the possible ‘rearguard’
nature of my task, I should like to defend the classical practice [of invoking
legislative history] and convince you that those who attack it ought to claim
victory once they have made judges more sensitive to problems of the abuse of
legislative history; they ought not to condemn its use altogether. They should
confine their attack to the outskirts and leave the citadel at peace.”).
34
See Abner J. Mikva, A Reply to Judge Starr’s Observations, 1987 DUKE L.J.
380, 385 (“[Courts] must deal with the problem of resolving fine ambiguities in a
statute, ambiguities where courts really do not know what a Congress had in
mind. My approach is to go to the place in the legislative history where the
majority did focus on the ambiguity. To this end, I always find that the committee
report is the most useful device; it is what I use to try to resolve some of those
ambiguities. Most of the time—not always, and not for every committee—the
committee report represents the synthesis of the last meaningful discussion and
debate on the issue.”); Abner J. Mikva, Reading and Writing Statutes, 28 S. TEX. L.
REV. 181, 184 (1986) [hereinafter Mikva, Reading and Writing Statutes] (“The
committee report is the bone structure of the legislation. It is the road map that
explains why things are in and things are out of the statute.”).
35
See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 13, at 641–42; Farber & Frickey, supra note
20, at 442–43; infra notes 49–52 and accompanying text.
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II
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
A.

The Ideological Quality of the Support for Attacks on
the Use of Legislative History and the Responses
to It

Justice Scalia and others who attacked the use of legislative history and advocated for textualism articulated their concerns in closely related terms of process and reliability. Scalia
repeatedly noted that the only thing on which Congress voted
was the text of the legislation.36 Members might look to committee reports for guidance as to the meaning of provisions, but
what they actually approved was the text itself, and nothing
else. Relatedly, because committee reports (and of course
statements from floor debates and committee hearings) were
not part of what Congress formally approved, one could not be
confident that they accurately reflected the majority coalition.37 And, even more strongly, members of the majority coali36
This is a theme that Scalia articulated even before he was elevated to the
Supreme Court. See Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. ICC, 749 F.2d 875, 893 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Legislative compromise (which is to say most intelligent legislation) becomes impossible when there is no assurance that the statutory words in which it is contained will be honored. Those members of Congress
who unsuccessfully oppose a legislative initiative favored by the Executive have
every reason to fear that any ambiguity they leave in the statute will be interpreted
against their interests by the implementing agency. But they also have every
reason to trust that the clear limitations they succeed in imposing will be faithfully observed. Those are the rules of the game.”); Eskridge, supra note 13, at
653–54 (“Judge Scalia in 1985–86 argued that judicial inquiry into legislative
intentions is inconsistent with our constitutional separation of powers. ‘Surely it
is more consonant with that doctrine that—once a statute is enacted—its meaning is to be determined on the basis of its text by the Executive officers charged
with its enforcement and the Judicial officers charged with its application.’” (footnote omitted) (quoting the speech that Scalia delivered at many law schools between fall 1985 and spring 1986, supra note 20)); see also Starr, supra note 20, at
375 (“Under democratic theory, the statute rather than extrastatutory materials
governs the nation. Legislative history, however, has the potential to mute (or
indeed override) the voice of the statute itself. In terms of democratic theory, the
use of legislative history can distort the proper voice of each branch of our constitutional government.”).
37
See, e.g., United States v. Taylor 487 U.S. 326, 345 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (“[I]t must be assumed that what the Members of the House and the
Senators thought they were voting for, and what the President thought he was
approving when he signed the bill, was what the text plainly said, rather than
what a few Representatives, or even a Committee Report, said it said.”); Blanchard
v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I am confident that
only a small proportion of the Members of Congress read either one of the Committee Reports in question, even if (as is not always the case) the Reports happened to have been published before the vote; that very few of those who did read
them set off for the nearest law library to check out what was actually said in the
four cases at issue (or in the more than 50 other cases cited by the House and
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tion would be unlikely to be moved by, or even know about, a
colloquy on the floor or in a committee hearing between two
members.38 Legislative history, Scalia suggested, was likely
written by staffers or lobbyists who were attempting not to
inform members of Congress but instead to influence judges’
interpretation of the statute.39
Senate Reports).”); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (Scalia,
J., concurring) (1989) (criticizing the majority’s invocation of committee reports
and stating that “[t]he meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be determined, not on the basis of which meaning can be shown to have been understood
by a larger handful of the Members of Congress; but rather on the basis of which
meaning is (1) most in accord with context and ordinary usage, and thus most
likely to have been understood by the whole Congress which voted on the words of
the statute (not to mention the citizens subject to it), and (2) most compatible with
the surrounding body of law into which the provision must be integrated—a
compatibility which, by a benign fiction, we assume Congress always has in
mind.”); Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 620 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (“Assuming that all the members of the three Committees in question
(as opposed to just the relevant Subcommittees) actually adverted to the interpretive point at issue here—which is probably an unrealistic assumption—and assuming further that they were in unanimous agreement on the point, they would
still represent less than two-fifths of the Senate, and less than one-tenth of the
House. It is most unlikely that many Members of either Chamber read the pertinent portions of the Committee Reports before voting on the bill—assuming (we
cannot be sure) that the Reports were available before the vote.”); City of Chicago
v. Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 337 (1994) (Scalia, J.) (“[I]t is the statute, and
not the Committee Report, which is the authoritative expression of the law, and
the statute prominently omits reference to generation.”).
38
See, e.g., Overseas Educ. Ass’n, Inc. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 876
F.2d 960, 975 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Buckley, J., concurring) (“Far less reliable, as
sources of statutory meaning, are remarks made during floor debate—even ‘authoritative’ explanations offered by a bill’s sponsors. While a sponsor’s statements may reveal his understanding and intentions, they hardly provide definitive
insights into Congress’ understanding of the meaning of a particular provision.
Few of his fellow legislators will have been on hand to hear the gloss the sponsor
may have placed on a particular provision. Thus members of Congress, in voting
on a measure, must be presumed to have relied on the meaning of the words read
in context on a printed page.”); Scalia, supra note 1, at 32 (“In earlier days, when
Congress had a smaller staff and enacted less legislation, it might have been
possible to believe that a significant number of senators or representatives were
present for the floor debate, or to read the committee reports, and actually voted
on the basis of what they heard or read. Those days, if they ever existed, are long
gone. The floor is rarely crowded for a debate, the members being generally
occupied with committee business and reporting to the floor only when a quorum
call is demanded or a vote is to be taken.”).
39
See, e.g., Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98–99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring):
As anyone familiar with modern-day drafting of congressional committee reports is well aware, the references to the cases [cited by the
majority] were inserted, at best by a committee staff member on his
or her own initiative, and at worst by a committee staff member at
the suggestion of a lawyer-lobbyist; and the purpose of those references was not primarily to inform the Members of Congress what
the bill meant . . . but rather to influence judicial construction.
In his concurrence in United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326 (1988), Scalia quoted
and criticized the following statement from a member of Congress: “I have an
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Scalia and other textualists stated that their approach was
not designed to favor one set of outcomes over another, and
amendment here in my hand which could be offered, but if we can make up some
legislative history which would do the same thing, I am willing to do it.” Id. at 345
(Scalia, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted). And in the book that inspired
Judge Posner’s harsh review in The New Republic, quoted infra note 42, Scalia
and Bryan Garner said:
[W]hereas courts used to refer to legislative history because it existed, today it exists—in all its ever-increasing, profuse detail—because the courts refer to it. Legislators engage in floor colloquies
(again, typically before an empty house) precisely to induce courts to
accept their views about how the statute works. (They have been
known to preface a colloquy with, “Let’s make some legislative history.”) Anyone familiar with the congressional scene knows that one
of the regular jobs of Washington law firms is to draft legislative
history—to be read on the floor or inserted into committee reports.
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 29, at 377 (footnotes omitted).
Of course, many others disagreed with Scalia’s characterization of the drafting and use of legislative history, particularly committee reports. See, e.g., Mikva,
Reading and Writing Statutes, supra note 34, at 385; Wald, Sizzling Sleeper, supra
note 28, at 306–07; KATZMANN, supra note 13, at 37–39 (stating that legislators
themselves use legislative history, particularly committee reports, and that there
are reasons for it to remain reliable); Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman,
Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional
Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 977 (2013)
(finding that 59% of congressional staffers they surveyed singled out committee
and conference reports as “as very reliable sources for legislators to consider” as
well as the most reliable forms of legislative history); Statutory Interpretation and
the Uses of Legislative History: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
101st Cong. 21 (1990) (“[M]y understanding of most of the legislation I voted on
[while a U.S. Senator] was based entirely on my reading of its language and, where
necessary, on explanations contained in the [committee] report.”) (statement of
Judge James L. Buckley).
Some textualists, most prominently Judge Easterbrook, also argued that
looking for legislative purpose or intent was a fool’s errand. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 59, 65 (1988) (“The meaning of statutes is to be found not in the subjective,
multiple mind of Congress but in the understanding of the objectively reasonable
person.”). Scalia, by contrast, disparaged the notion of subjective legislative intent but invoked objective legislative purpose or intent as a valuable element of
statutory construction. See, e.g., Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 99–100 (1989) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (“Except for the few passages to which I object, today’s opinion
admirably follows our more recent approach of seeking to develop an interpretation of the statute that is reasonable, consistent, and faithful to its apparent
purpose, rather than to achieve obedient adherence to cases cited in the committee reports.”); United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 447 (1988) (Scalia, J.) (“In
the context of the entire statutory scheme, we think it displays a clear congressional intent to deny the excluded employees the protections of [the statute].”);
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia J., dissenting) (“[W]hile it is
possible to discern the objective ‘purpose’ of a statute (i.e., the public good at
which its provisions appear to be directed), or even the formal motivation for a
statute where that is explicitly set forth (as it was, to no avail, here), discerning the
subjective motivation of those enacting the statute is, to be honest, almost always
an impossible task.”); Karkkainen, supra note 29, at 410–19 (discussing the role
of legislative intent and purpose in Scalia’s jurisprudence).
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more generally was not ideological in design or likely result.
They said their focus was on methodology, not results.40 That
stated focus makes sense: methodology is absolutely essential
to judging, so getting the methodology right in judicial opinions
is of enormous importance.
That said, as the discussion in the previous Part suggests,
the advocacy for and embrace of textualism and against legislative history had an ideological element from the outset: Scalia
was known as a particularly conservative judge (and then Justice), and most of the other prominent advocates were ideological conservatives as well (Judges Alex Kozinski, Frank
Easterbrook, Kenneth Starr, etc.).41 Simply stated, the movement against legislative history had a strong ideological skew.
Why? This goes beyond this Article and is speculative, but
broadly speaking there are two obvious explanatory factors.
First, it may be that, notwithstanding Scalia’s disavowals of a
focus on outcomes, ideological conservatives in fact expected
that textualism would be a means to achieve ideologically conservative statutory interpretations. They may have expected
that looking to purpose and legislative history would tend to
broaden the scope of governmental authority and thus be more
attractive to those who prefer broad regulatory authority, and
that looking only to text would tend to do the opposite. Those
taking this position would acknowledge that there will be some
cases in which legislative history will have the effect of narrowing some seemingly broad statutory language, but expect that
more often legislative history will show that Congress intended
a broad sweep for its handiwork—and a broader sweep than
40

See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 29, at 16.
See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text; supra notes 32, 39; see
also Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 373 (2005) (“[T]oday’s
textualists tend to be politically conservative.”). The most prominent early exception was Democratic Judge and later Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. In 1987 she
wrote an opinion following Scalia’s opinion in Hirschey, see Abourezk v. Reagan,
785 F.2d 1043, 1054–55 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1986), but in her later years on the D.C.
Circuit and during her time on the Supreme Court she regularly cited legislative
history (and Scalia followed his practice of concurring in everything except for her
invocation of legislative history). See, e.g., Fedway Assocs., Inc. v. U.S. Treasury,
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 976 F.2d 1416, 1421 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(Ruth Bader Ginsburg, J.) (stating that “[t]he relevant legislative history strongly
supports our reading of the plain meaning of the text” and then discussing the
legislative history); W. Coast Sheet Metal, Inc. v. NLRB, 938 F.2d 1356, 1361 (D.C.
Cir. 1991) (Ruth Bader Ginsburg, J.) (quoting at length from legislative history);
Bank One Chi. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 273 (1996) (Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, J.) (relying on the drafting history of a statute as reflected in the
House Report and the conference committee report); id. at 279 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating “I agree with the Court’s opinion, except that portion of it which
enters into a discussion of ‘[t]he drafting history of § 4010.’”).
41
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the bare words of the legislation might suggest. Insofar as
those were the expectations, it might lead to an ideological
divide over legislative history and textualism versus
purposivism.42
Second, ideological conservatives might prefer the apparently more rigorous methodology of textualism irrespective of
any changes in ideological outcome that it might produce.
Much of the criticism of the use of legislative history focused on
the fact that judges could usually find something in the legislative history that supported almost any given statutory interpretation and thus was far too empowering of judges. The most
42
See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Spirit Killeth, But the Letter Giveth Life,
NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 13, 2012, at 18 (“[T]he textual originalist demands that the
legislature think through myriad hypothetical scenarios and provide for all of
them explicitly rather than rely on courts to be sensible. In this way, textualism
hobbles legislation—and thereby tilts toward ‘small government’ and away from
‘big government,’ which in modern America is a conservative preference.”); Steven
R. Greenberger, Civil Rights and the Politics of Statutory Interpretation, 62 U. COLO.
L. REV. 37, 68 (1991) (“Barring judges from looking at the history of a statute and
confining them strictly to its text means that the statute will only apply in those
instances that Congress explicitly passes upon. The scope of governmental regulation is thereby constricted.”); Glen Staszewski, Textualism and the Executive
Branch, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 143, 181 n.178 (2009) (“[T]he new textualism
arguably makes it more difficult for Congress to achieve its underlying objectives
because courts have a tendency to interpret the law in a relatively stingy fashion
pursuant to this methodology.”); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme
Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 410 (1991) (arguing
that formalism “embodies a relatively antigovernmental philosophy”); Andrei
Marmor, The Immorality of Textualism, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2063, 2066 (2005) (“By
advocating a theory of statutory interpretation that is preoccupied with literal
meaning, and purportedly relies on bright-line rules or canons of statutory interpretation, textualism strives to effectuate a broader ideological agenda that seeks
to reduce the state and its regulatory functions to the necessary minimum.”). In
this regard, it may be relevant that between 1933 and 1994, Democrats controlled
the House of Representatives for all but four years, and the Senate for all but ten
years, whereas during that span Republicans occupied the White House for 28
years. Simply stated, until 1995 the lived experience of judges (and everyone else)
was of largely Democratic control of the House and Senate but a more even
balance with respect to the White House. Insofar as invoking legislative history
was understood to give additional weight and scope to members of the legislative
majority (that is, in addition to what they had put in the legislative text), that
would have meant giving additional weight to what had usually been Democratic
majorities. See also infra note 106 and accompanying text.
The view that textualism is ideologically conservative is by no means universal. Maggie Lemos, for example, argues against it, noting that “whether a ‘stingy’
reading of statutes will appeal to political conservatives would seem to depend on
the laws in question,” and contending that “a textualist reading is not necessarily
more restrictive than a reading that is grounded on considerations of statutory
purpose or evidence of legislative intent.” Lemos, supra note 29, at 865–66, 869;
see also Alexander Volokh, Choosing Interpretive Methods: A Positive Theory of
Judges and Everyone Else, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 769, 815–19 (2008) (arguing that an
association between political conservatism and textualism may be a result of
judges’ self-selection bias).
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famous line critical of the use of legislative history—one that
Scalia himself invoked in one of his many separate opinions
criticizing its use—was from Judge Harold Leventhal, a D.C.
Circuit judge prominent in the 1970s, who said that “the use of
legislative history [was] the equivalent of entering a crowded
cocktail party and looking over the heads of the guests for one’s
friends.”43 The concern was that the use of legislative history
provided judges with the ability to reach their favored statutory
outcome. Ideological conservatives, including not just judges
and scholars but also politicians, frequently criticized judges
for “legislating from the bench.” This became a popular refrain
among ideological conservatives in the 1980s.44 The idea was
that judges were arrogating to themselves authority that was
properly in the political branches. The jurist who was most
closely associated with this critique was Justice Scalia. His
position, and that of many other supporters of textualism and
against the use of legislative history, was that their methodological approach limited judicial discretion and was concomitantly preferable.45 This might have an ideological skew
43
Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Scalia introduced the Leventhal reference with the following language:
The greatest defect of legislative history is its illegitimacy. We are
governed by laws, not by the intentions of legislators. . . . But not
the least of the defects of legislative history is its indeterminacy. If
one were to search for an interpretive technique that, on the whole,
was more likely to confuse than to clarify, one could hardly find a
more promising candidate than legislative history.
Id.
44
See, e.g., George H.W. Bush, Candidates State Positions on Federal Judicial
Selection, 72 JUDICATURE 77 (1988) (“I am firmly committed to appointing judges
who are dedicated to interpreting the law as it exists, rather than legislating from
the bench.”); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION
OF THE LAW 1 (1990):
In law, the moment of temptation is the moment of choice, when a
judge realizes that in the case before him his strongly held view of
justice, his political and moral imperative, is not embodied in a
statute or in any provision of the Constitution. He must then
choose between his version of justice and abiding by the American
form of government. Yet the desire to do justice, whose nature
seems to him obvious, is compelling, while the concept of constitutional process is abstract, rather arid, and the abstinence it counsels unsatisfying. To give in to temptation, this one time solves an
urgent human problem, and a faint crack appears in the American
foundation. A judge has begun to rule where a legislator should.
45
See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1175, 1185 (1989) (“[W]hen one does not have a solid textual anchor . . . from
which to derive the general rule, its pronouncement appears uncomfortably like
legislation.”); SCALIA, supra note 1, at 35 (contending that courts’ use of legislative
history “has facilitated rather than deterred decisions that are based upon the
courts’ policy preferences, rather than neutral principles of law”); id. at 132 (“[T]he
judge who uses ‘legislative intent or other interpretative methods’ does not en-
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insofar as ideological conservatives are likely to prefer that decisions are made by democratically accountable decisionmakers (a theme that also underlies arguments, again
more likely to be embraced by ideological conservatives, for
greater presidential control over the executive branch, and particularly independent agencies).46 Ignoring legislative history
and relying solely on text might also appeal to those (again,
prominently including Scalia himself) who preferred bright-line
rules and categorical approaches to flexible or eclectic approaches that would allow for variations depending on the situation.47 Bright-line rules might appeal to jurists who are
ideologically conservative, but that does not mean that there is
a causal relationship.48
Interestingly, and as suggested at the end of the previous
Part, prominent ideologically liberal judges and commentators
had sympathy for some aspects of this critique. For instance,
Scalia’s D.C. Circuit colleague Judge Patricia Wald also quoted
with apparent disapproval the statement from Judge Leventhal
tirely abandon text, but rather adds to whatever manipulability text contains the
(much greater) manipulability of his extratextual methodology. I concede, of
course, that textualism is no ironclad protection against the judge who wishes to
impose his will, but it is some protection. The criterion of ‘legislative intent,’ by
contrast, positively invites the judge to impose his will . . . it reduces him to
guessing that the legislature intended what was most reasonable, which ordinarily coincides with what the judge himself thinks best.”); see also Herrmann v.
Cencom Cable Assocs., Inc., 978 F.2d 978, 982 (7th Cir. 1992) (Easterbrook, J.,)
(stating that textualism “cuts down the amount of judicial discretion, for judges
free to bend law to ‘intents’ that are invented more than they are discovered
become the real authors of the rule”).
46
Not coincidentally, Scalia was also the leading judicial voice for this “unitary executive” theory, which posits that the President must be able to oversee all
of the executive branch. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing at length for a unitary executive theory that would
invalidate as unconstitutional a statute allowing for an independent counsel
whom the President could not directly control and could not fire at will). This
theory, like textualism, gained particular prominence among ideological conservatives during the Reagan Administration, though it was not limited to them.
47
See Scalia, supra note 45, at 1176, 1184–85 (contrasting general rules of
law with discretion to do justice and preferring the former, and using textualism
as one example of the former).
48
Maggie Lemos suggests a way in which these might be connected:
Suppose that individuals who are drawn to political conservatism
also tend to be drawn to relatively bright-line rules. Suppose, further, that while the two tendencies are correlated with each other,
one does not cause the other; instead, the same psychological forces
that lead individuals to rules also lead many of them to adopt politically conservative views. If these suppositions were correct, they
might provide a decidedly non-political explanation for the political
patterns we observe in the adoption and rejection of textualism
among judges and academics.
Lemos, supra note 29, at 889–90 n.207 (citation omitted).
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quoted above.49 She and other respondents to Scalia often
argued against a practice of citing any legislative history that
might be available.50 They did not defend notions like that in
Overton Park that a court should look to text only if the legislative history was not clear. On the contrary, they insisted that
courts should begin with the statutory text and look to legislative history only to resolve textual ambiguities.51 But these
ideologically liberal judges and commentators argued that rigor
could be consistent with citing legislative history: courts
should cite reliable legislative history like committee reports,
whereas they should be very careful about citing the generally
less reliable categories of floor debates and hearings.52
49
See Wald, supra note 16, at 214 (“I am left with the sense, expressed by
Justice Stevens in a dissent late last Term, that consistent and uniform rules for
statutory construction and use of legislative materials are not being followed
today. It sometimes seems that citing legislative history is still, as my late colleague Harold Leventhal once observed, akin to ‘looking over a crowd and picking
out your friends.’” (footnotes omitted)).
50
See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text.
51
See Breyer, supra note 33, at 863 (“No one claims that legislative history is
a statute, or even that, in any strong sense, it is ‘law.’ Rather, legislative history is
helpful in trying to understand the meaning of the words that do make up the
statute or the ‘law.’ A judge cannot interpret the words of an ambiguous statute
without looking beyond its words for the words have simply ceased to provide
univocal guidance to decide the case at hand.”).
52
Judge Mikva brought these points together and is worth quoting at length:
If the [statute’s] words are capable of a clear meaning that can be
applied to the case at hand, we ought to look no further. As Judge
Leventhal said, one can always find some friends in the legislative
history. Judges ought not tilt the result by looking unnecessarily.
Unfortunately, the plain meaning doctrine does not answer many of
the interpretation disputes that judges are called upon to resolve.
For many reasons, including original sin, legislators do not always
speak plainly, and certainly not comprehensively. There will be numerous occasions in which the judges must look to the legislative
history to decide the cases before them.
. . . . Seldom is the floor debate the vehicle by which the legislative branch resolves its wording disputes. Those arguments are
much more likely to be resolved in committee and reflected in the
committee report. Nevertheless, some judges think that the committee report is “unreliable” because it is written by staff rather than
by Members of Congress. Other judges do not think about the committee report at all. I think it ought to be the first place that judges
look to find out what Congress meant. The enemy is not legislative
records—only bad legislative records.
. . . . Legislators will frequently use the easy access to the
Congressional Record as a device to confuse the plain meaning of a
statute. Judges will frequently get gulled by this device.
Abner J. Mikva, Statutory Interpretation: Getting the Law to Be Less Common, 50
OHIO ST. L.J. 979, 981–82 (1989); see also Wald, Sizzling Sleeper, supra note 28,
at 306–07 (“To disregard committee reports as indicators of congressional understanding because we are suspicious that nefarious staffers have planted certain
information for some undisclosed reason, is to second-guess Congress’ chosen
form of organization and delegation of authority, and to doubt its ability to oversee
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The Implications for Judicial Behavior

Insofar as ideologically conservative judges’ embrace of textualism, and concomitant dismissal of legislative history, reflected a desire to achieve ideologically conservative case
outcomes, and insofar as methodology imposes some constraint, one might expect to see an increase in conservative
outcomes for judges who abjured reliance on legislative history.
If methodology imposes no constraint, then presumably judges
would reach the same outcomes whether or not they used legislative history.
Other scholars have looked at case outcomes to see what
role the use of legislative history has played. In a study of 320
opinions on labor-employer relations by eight liberal Supreme
Court Justices from the 1969 to 2006 terms, Brudney and
Ditslear concluded that when liberal Justices cite legislative
history materials in their reasoning, they often do so to justify a
higher proportion of their pro-employer outcomes than their
pro-employee decisions.53 Benesh and Czarnezki studied all
nonunanimous decisions issued by the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit from the 1997 term through the 2003
term in the legal areas of criminal procedure, civil rights, First
Amendment, due process, and privacy.54 After controlling for
the ideology of the judges and identifying whether a case was
resolved in a liberal or conservative ideological direction, the
authors did not observe a statistically significant relationship
between a judge’s career usage of legislative history and the
likelihood a judge will vote conservatively.55
its own constitutional functions effectively. It comes perilously close, in my view,
to impugning the way a coordinate branch conducts its operations and, in that
sense, runs the risk of violating the spirit if not the letter of the separation of
powers principle.”); Wald, supra note 16, at 201 (“Committee reports indeed remain the most widely accepted indicators of Congress’ intent.”); Farber & Frickey,
supra note 20, at 448 (“American public law has quite properly recognized that
statutory meaning is necessarily greatly influenced by statutory context. Legislative history is part of that context, and some aspects of it—such as committee
reports—will frequently represent the most intelligent exposition available of what
the statute is all about.” (footnote omitted)); James J. Brudney, Congressional
Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1, 41–56 (1994) (considering and rejecting constitutional and practical arguments for disregarding or devaluing legislative history,
especially committee reports).
53
See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 24, at 125–28 (presenting evidence
against the view that legislative history is invoked opportunistically by federal
judges).
54
Sara C. Benesh & Jason J. Czarnezki, The Ideology of Legal Interpretation,
29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 113, 124–25 (2009) (suggesting that legislative history is
invoked opportunistically by federal judges).
55
Id. at 130–31.

R
R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\105-4\CRN401.txt

1050

unknown

Seq: 28

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

28-JUL-20

7:36

[Vol. 105:1023

Focusing on outcomes is useful, but it relies on contestable
(and contested) ideological coding of how conservative or liberal
a given decision is.56 In this Article, we ask a more parsimonious question that focuses on citations to legislative history.
Those advocating for textualism and attacking the use of legislative history argued that judges were making a methodological
mistake insofar as they cited legislative history, and they urged
that judges refrain from doing so. That is, the central methodological implication of this focus on text is that courts should
not look to legislative history in construing statutes. Legislative history was irrelevant to the proper interpretation of statutes, and courts should avoid citing it. Thus Scalia frequently
joined a majority opinion in all respects except the portion of it
that cited legislative history. This makes for a straightforward
analysis of judicial citation behavior: the more judges cite legis-

56
For arguments against the reliability of coding, see Hon. Harry T. Edwards
& Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies That Attempt to Understand
the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895, 1925 (2009):
[I]t is very difficult to characterize many case outcomes. For example, the general rights embraced by freedom of religion and freedom
of expression sometimes conflict with the exercise of other rights; it
may not be clear how presumed liberal or conservative judges
should be expected to vote in such cases. Cases may be disposed of
on procedural grounds that are essentially nonideological, leading
to coding errors when the outcome must be coded as liberal or
conservative. A court’s interpretation of a statute may defy ideological description (e.g., rate allocations in a matter before the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission, where the parties before the court
are competing companies). . . . [M]any appeals involve multiple,
complex issues, thus making it impossible to describe the appellate
court’s disposition as liberal or conservative.
See also Carolyn Shapiro, Coding Complexity: Bringing Law to the Empirical Analysis of the Supreme Court, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 477, 480–81 (2009) (“[R]ather than
illuminate the workings of the Supreme Court, some empirical findings may reflect the way the [Supreme Court Judicial] Database reports [or codes] information.”); Anna Harvey & Michael J. Woodruff, Confirmation Bias in the United States
Supreme Court Judicial Database, 29 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 414, 415–21 (2013) (finding, as the title suggests, confirmation bias in the Supreme Court Judicial
Database); Ernest A. Young, Just Blowing Smoke? Politics, Doctrine, and the Federalist Revival After Gonzales v. Raich, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 11–14 (arguing that
ideological coding of case outcomes is fraught with difficulties, and that “the
different factors used to code a case as ‘conservative’ or ‘liberal’ may cut in different directions within the confines of a single case”).
For arguments in favor of the reliability of coding, see, e.g., Tonja Jacobi &
Matthew Sag, Taking the Measure of Ideology: Empirically Measuring Supreme
Court Cases, 98 GEORGETOWN L.J. 1, 8 n.30 (2009) (defending the ideological
coding of cases in the Supreme Court Judicial Database); Tracey E. George,
Developing a Positive Theory of Decisionmaking on U.S. Courts of Appeals, 58 OHIO
STATE L.J. 1635, 1673 n.129 (1998) (arguing in favor of ideological coding).
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lative history in their majority opinions, the less they are following Scalia.57
Others have looked at citation patterns generally. One
strand of this research focuses on how much influence Justice
Scalia’s crusade against legislative history and concomitant
embrace of textualist statutory interpretation had over the Supreme Court.58 Koby studied opinions by the Court from the
time Scalia was nominated in 1986 to 1998, finding an overall
decline in citations to committee reports, congressional debates, and committee hearings in Supreme Court opinions during this period.59 Mikva and Lane concluded that little has
changed in the way courts interpret statutes, and argue that
because the Supreme Court, lower federal courts, and state
courts of last resort continue to use legislative history materials to interpret statutes, textualism did not have deep and
persistent effects.60
57
Judges frequently cite legislative history (and other relevant legal materials
like enacted statutes and prior opinions) and then conclude that the cited material is not dispositive in that case. In such a situation, the judge is treating the
category of legislative history as relevant but finding that this particular legislative
history does not help to resolve the case. That is in tension with Justice Scalia’s
repeated admonitions to avoid citing legislative history in the first place. Scalia
pithily summarized his long-held views on citing legislative history in a 1996 case:
“The text’s the thing. We should therefore ignore drafting history without discussing it, instead of after discussing it.” Bank One Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank &
Tr. Co., 516 U.S. 264, 283 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring). It is also possible that a
judge might cite legislative history but also indicate that all legislative history is
irrelevant. Again, in doing so, the judge would not be adopting Scalia’s position
(and his frequent practice in joining all of a majority opinion except for its discussion of legislative history) that judges should generally ignore legislative history in
the first place. And in our review of cases for this Article, we found a range of
reliance on legislative history (some opinions relied on it, some treated it as useful
but not dispositive, some treated it as relevant but not adding much, etc.), but no
opinions that cited legislative history only to state all that all legislative history is
irrelevant. That said, we cannot rule out the possibility that on some occasions
judges so stated, although we have no reason to believe that such a possibility
changes our results.
58
See Charles Tiefer, The Reconceptualization of Legislative History in the
Supreme Court, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 205, 212–21 (2000).
59
See Michael H. Koby, The Supreme Court’s Declining Reliance on Legislative
History: The Impact of Justice Scalia’s Critique, 36 HARV. J. LEGIS. 369, 384–87
(1999); see also Siegel, supra note 26, at 401–13 (finding that briefs filed in the
Supreme Court continued to cite legislative history, perhaps reflecting the fact
that Scalia never achieved a majority on the Supreme Court for his complete
rejection of legislative history and thus counsel wanted to cite legislative history in
the hope of persuading those who looked to it).
60
See Abner J. Mikva & Eric Lane, The Muzak of Justice Scalia’s Revolutionary Call to Read Unclear Statutes Narrowly, 53 SMU L. REV. 121, 121–23 (2000)
(discussing that Scalia’s crusade against legislative history materials in statutory
interpretation had more profound effect on scholars than judges).
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A second relevant strand of research focuses on the impact
of Scalia’s campaign against the use of legislative history on
federal appellate courts. Bruhl uncovered evidence that courts
of appeals adopt patterns of statutory interpretation from the
Supreme Court.61 Similarly, Cross argued that lower federal
courts may take statutory interpretation cues from the Supreme Court and adapt their own interpretive methods accordingly.62 A number of research projects have found evidence
that lower courts absorb and implement the Supreme Court’s
patterns of statutory interpretation.63 Notably, Bridgman explored all citations to legislative history materials in published
federal appellate opinions from 1950 to 2006.64 By analyzing
overall citation rates and the rate at which certain types of
legislative materials are cited, he found that during the 1970s
and 1980s the D.C. Circuit’s use of legislative materials
tracked the Supreme Court more closely than the other circuits.65 Bridgman found that the disparity between the D.C.
Circuit and the other circuits cannot be fully accounted for by
the D.C. Circuit handling more statutory interpretation cases
or writing longer opinions.66 Cross counted the number of
opinions published by federal appellate courts each year that
contain a reference to “legislative history,” “Conference Committee,” Westlaw Keynumbers associated with textualism, and
Westlaw Keynumbers associated with pragmatism.67 Among
many notable findings, Cross observed a steady decline in the
rate federal courts of appeals refer to “legislative history” in the
late 1980s.68 Brudney and Baum, focusing on Supreme Court
61
See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Communicating the Canons: How Lower
Courts React When the Supreme Court Changes the Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 100 MINN. L. REV. 481, 483, 540–41 (2015).
62
See FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
187–89 (2008) (counting the number of opinions published by each courts of
appeals each year that contain a reference to “legislative history,” “Conference
Committee,” along with the Westlaw Keynumbers associated with textualism, and
the Westlaw Keynumbers associated with pragmatism).
63
See Bridgman, supra note 15, at 1 (studying patterns of citations to legislative history in courts of appeals from 1950 to 2006); see also Bruhl, supra note 61,
at 491–93 (discussing the large scale trends of statutory interpretation methods
in lower federal courts and identifying these trends as evidence that a movement
towards a more formal system of stare decisis for statutory interpretation is possible); Fritz Snyder, Legislative History and Statutory Interpretation: The Supreme
Court and the Tenth Circuit, 49 OKLA. L. REV. 573, 573–89 (1996) (noting patterns
of statutory interpretation between the Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit).
64
See Bridgman, supra note 15, at 12–14.
65
Id. at 25–26.
66
Id. at 31–32, 35–36.
67
CROSS, supra note 62, at 184.
68
See id. at 187.
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and appellate court decisions from 2005 to 2015, found that
the Supreme Court has been far more likely to cite legislative
history than the Courts of Appeals.69 In separate papers using
different datasets, both Bruhl and Brudney/Baum considered
appellate cases reviewed by the Supreme Court (so the same
case produces an appellate and a Supreme Court opinion) and
found that even when the Supreme Court and the appellate
court cite legislative history, they often invoke different legislative history materials.70 Among their conclusions was that federal appellate courts do not treat Supreme Court opinions as
creating methodological stare decisis with respect to legislative
history (or other interpretive resources).
Other scholars have explored some impacts of ideology on
judges’ use of legislative history. Abramowicz and Tiller found
that federal district court judges were modestly influenced by
the ideological composition of the appellate court above them
and of their colleagues.71 Law and Zaring evaluated ideology
and statutory interpretation with regard to the Supreme Court,
finding that Justices are more likely to consult legislative history materials when they are ideologically aligned with the political party that enacted the statute they are interpreting.72
In this Article we examine citations to legislative history in
light of judicial political party. As the discussion above suggests, we hypothesize that the attacks on the judicial use of
legislative history would have more traction with ideologically
conservative judges than ideologically liberal judges.73 The
most straightforward measure of ideology is political party, and
in particular the political party of the most recent President to
69
James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Protean Statutory Interpretation in
the Courts of Appeals, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 681, 707–22 (2017).
70
James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Two Roads Diverged: Statutory Interpretation by the Supreme Court and the Circuit Courts in the Same Cases, 88
FORDHAM L. REV. 823, 837–63 (2019); Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Statutory Interpretation and the Rest of the Iceberg: Divergences Between the Lower Federal Courts
and the Supreme Court, 68 DUKE L.J. 1, 50 (2018).
71
See Michael Abramowicz & Emerson H. Tiller, Citation to Legislative History: Empirical Evidence on Positive Political and Contextual Theories of Judicial
Decision Making, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 419, 419 (2009) (noting that an authoring
judge will have a greater tendency to cite legislative history by legislators who
share political party affiliation with the colleagues and superiors of the authoring
judge than legislators sharing the same political party affiliation as the authoring
judge himself).
72
See David S. Law & David Zaring, Law Versus Ideology: The Supreme Court
and the Use of Legislative History, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1653, 1726 (2009).
73
One way of conceptualizing this point is that those more likely to be affected by Scalia’s attacks will, at the margin, be less likely to cite legislative
history. And the bigger the impact, the bigger the margin. The more they are
influenced, the more dubious they will be about citing legislative history.
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nominate a given judge.74 We thus expect that, in the federal
appellate courts, there was a difference between how Democratic and Republican judges responded to the attacks on legislative history in their citation practices. Specifically, we
hypothesize that Republican circuit judges would have a
stronger reaction to the attacks on legislative history.
Justice Scalia’s message was straightforward: legislative
history is irrelevant to statutory interpretation and thus judges
should generally ignore it. This yields an expectation: the more
fully judges adopt Scalia’s position, the more likely they will be
to ignore legislative history relative to those who do not adopt
his position. Correspondingly, the more judges cite legislative
history, the less they are following Scalia’s lead, because they
are citing what he considers to be irrelevant materials. Citation
counts have obvious limitations: we have only the bare fact of
citation, without additional information about exactly how
much weight a judge put on the cited source. But in this case
bare citations are significant, because they are inconsistent
with Scalia’s general position. A citation to legislative history in
a given opinion suggests that the author has rejected Scalia’s
methodological position on legislative history.75
We focus on the author of the majority opinion because the
opinion author is likely to have the predominant influence on
the prose of her opinion and the citations within it.76 Studies
have shown that circuit judges bargain over case outcomes,
but there is no clear empirical evidence that this bargaining
extends to the citations within those opinions.77
74
See, e.g., Pauline T. Kim, Deliberation and Strategy on the United States
Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Exploration of Panel Effects, 157 U. PA. L. REV.
1319, 1327 (2009) (noting the party of the most recent President to nominate a
judge is the standard practice for identifying the ideology of a judge; the last
President had the most information and circuit judgeships are more politically
salient and sensitive than district court judgeships); CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE
JUDGES POLITICAL?: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 5–7 (2006)
(using the President’s party as the measure of judicial ideology); Adam B. Cox &
Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (2008)
(same); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1718–19 (1997) (same).
75
See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
76
See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 95–107
(1997) (noting that the author of the majority opinion has the greatest impact on
the content within an opinion).
77
See, e.g., Paul J. Wahlbeck, James F. Spriggs, II & Forrest Maltzman,
Marshalling the Court: Bargaining and Accommodation on the United States Supreme Court, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 294, 311–13 (1998) (examining the extent of
accommodation in Supreme Court majority opinions by studying the draft opinions circulated by the majority opinion author); see also Sean Farhang & Gregory
Wawro, Institutional Dynamics on the U.S. Court of Appeals: Minority Representa-
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This leads to our first hypothesis: after the launching of the
attacks on judicial use of legislative history, circuit judges appointed by Republican Presidents would be significantly less
likely to cite all forms of legislative history than their Democratic counterparts.
Our second hypothesis involves the diffusion of ideas. Max
Planck famously said that “[a] new scientific truth does not
triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the
light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a
new generation grows up that is familiar with it.”78 The broad
point is that ideas that change the intellectual terrain are likely
to have a bigger impact on those who come of age after the
diffusion of the idea than on their predecessors. One arguable
example in law is law and economics. Commentators have
noted that law and economics had particular impact on lawyers, regulators, and professors who came of age after its rise
had begun.79 Simply stated, some movements shift the terms
of the debate going forward, with a greater influence on those
whose intellectual development occurs during or after the
debate.
Judges appointed before the 1980s joined the bench, and
thus began interpreting statutes and deciding what, if any,
tion Under Panel Decision Making, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 299, 321 (2004) (finding
that gender and ideological composition of federal appellate panels influences
whether panelists vote to reverse or affirm); Sheldon Goldman, Conflict and Consensus in the United States Courts of Appeals, 1968 WIS. L. REV. 461, 481 (arguing that bloc voting occurred on most federal appellate courts).
78
MAX PLANCK, SCIENTIFIC AUTOBIOGRAPHY AND OTHER PAPERS 33–34 (Frank Gaynor trans., 1949); see also THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
174–210 (3d ed. 1996). Paul Samuelson shortened Planck’s statement to the
pithier “science makes progress funeral by funeral,” adding: “the old are never
converted by the new doctrines, they simply are replaced by a new generation.”
See Science Makes Progress Funeral by Funeral, QUOTE INVESTIGATOR (Sept. 25,
2017), https://quoteinvestigator.com/2017/09/25/progress/ [https://perma.cc
/AVD3-CP5S].
79
See, e.g., Ugo Mattei, Efficiency as Equity: Insights from Comparative Law
and Economics, 18 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 157, 171 (1994) (“In the United
States, law and economics is already deeply influencing the methods of reasoning
of a new generation of lawyers, and its impact on the applied law is already a
reality.”); Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental
Regulation: A New Era from an Old Idea?, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 36 (1991) (“As the
bureaucracy has grown more aware of the reasoning behind market-based approaches, it has responded to them more favorably. Younger staff members in
particular have been influenced by the growth over the past decade of the ‘law and
economics’ movement within major law schools and the proliferation of professional schools of public policy.”); Bryan D. Lammon, What We Talk About When
We Talk About Ideology: Judicial Politics Scholarship and Naive Legal Realism, 83
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 231, 232 n.1 (2009) (“[L]aw and economics provided a tangible
theory of human behavior that would influence a generation of legal thought.”).
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sorts of legislative history to rely on, before the attacks began.
For those who became judges in the Reagan Administration
and thereafter, by contrast, the attacks on legislative history
occurred early in their judicial careers or before they ever
started. There is some evidence that these later-appointed
judges were more influenced by Scalia’s attacks on legislative
history than were their earlier-appointed counterparts. Gluck
and Posner interviewed forty-two federal appellate judges and
found generational differences. Notably, in contrast to older
judges, they “heard Justice Scalia’s and textualism’s influences
emphasized by younger judges of all political backgrounds.”80
This dovetails with dozens of conversations one of the authors
has had with judges and law professors who came of age before
and after Scalia launched his attacks.
We expect that later judges would be more impacted by the
arguments against legislative history than those who had been
engaging in statutory interpretation well before Scalia started
his attacks. And we would expect this effect would extend to
Democratic judges appointed after the Reagan Administration,
as Scalia’s attacks may have led lawyers of all political stripes
to examine their approach to legislative history. So we hypothesize that judges appointed by Reagan and later Presidents
were more influenced by the attacks on legislative history than
were their earlier-appointed counterparts. This leads to our
second hypothesis: after the launching of the attacks on judicial use of legislative history, circuit judges appointed by Reagan or later Presidents would be significantly less likely to cite
all forms of legislative history than circuit judges appointed by
earlier Presidents.
Our two hypotheses are independent of each other, so we
expect that each will operate independently, with the result
that post-Reagan Republican judges would be most affected by
the attacks on legislative history. That is, we hypothesize that
the post-Reagan effect interacts with judges’ political party
such that the post-Reagan effect would be greater among Republican cohorts than among Democratic cohorts.

80
See Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation on the
Bench: A Survey of Forty-Two Judges on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 131 HARV.
L. REV. 1298, 1312 (2018). Gluck and Lisa Bressman similarly suggest that there
may be a generational effect on legislative drafters’ awareness of judicial canons of
interpretation. See Gluck & Bressman, supra note 39, at 1022 (discussing the
“possibility that drafter awareness of the canons is generational and is changing
across time”).
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III
DATA AND MEASURES
We test our hypotheses by analyzing a dataset made up of
all published federal appellate court majority opinions between
1965 and 2011, totaling 240,933 opinions. The opinions we
use are from the Jonathan Mayer Advancing Empirical Legal
Scholarship data repository of published opinions (Mayer
Opinions).81 We developed a Python script that parsed each
opinion and drew out information on the circuit, the author of
the majority opinion, citations within the majority opinion, and
publication date. We matched the authoring judge with biographical information from the Federal Judicial Center containing the name and party of the President who most recently
nominated the judge and the date of the judge’s first commission to the federal judiciary. As we noted above, we use the
political party of the President who most recently nominated
the circuit judge as the measure of political party.82
Next, we identified instances of citations to legislative history materials. Some types of legislative history materials took
on a variety of citation formats. For example, in order to find all
citations to committee reports, including conference reports,
our searches included all iterations of “Conf. Rep.,” “H.R. Rep.,”
and “S. Rep.” We included all citation formats of which we were
aware, including formats from the Legal Bluebook as well as
nonstandard citation formats.83 So, for example, we searched
81
See Jonathan Mayer, Advancing Empirical Legal Scholarship: Federal Appellate Opinions and Rules, WEB POL’Y (May 3, 2013), http://webpolicy.org/2013/
05/03/advancing-empirical-legal-scholarship-federal-appellate-opinions-andrules/ [https://perma.cc/N68V-A5NG]. We created two samples of majority opinions from the Mayer Opinions and compared them with opinion data from the
Caselaw Access Project. Project: Caselaw Access Project, LIBR. INNOVATION LAB
(2019), https://case.law [https://perma.cc/22B9-ME94]. The first sample contained opinions with known citations to legislative history materials and the second sample contained opinions that did not include citations to legislative history
materials. We found that the opinions and their citations (or lack thereof)
matched with opinion data from the Caselaw Access Project. Moreover, the number of published opinions for each appellate court in our time period of interest
matched up with opinion data provided by the Caselaw Access Project.
82
See supra note 74.
83
See THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION, https://www.legalbluebook.com/ [https://perma.cc/XF3N-85K4] (last visited Feb. 10, 2020). We
searched for every standard and nonstandard citation form that we observed in
any opinion. But given the many conceivable nonstandard citation formats, we
cannot be completely confident we have captured the entire universe of citations
to legislative history materials in our data. That said, we are confident that we
have captured all citations when standard and obvious nonstandard citation
formats have been used. Further, we investigated the frequency of nonstandard
formats and found that there is no clear circuit-level or judge-level source driving
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both for “Cong. Rec.” (the Bluebook citation form for the Congressional Record) as well as nonstandard citation formats
such as “Cong. Record” and “Congressional Rec.”84 We also
included as a comparator two compendiums of duly enacted or
promulgated federal laws—the United States Code and the
Code of Federal Regulations. These two sources are of course
quite different from legislative history materials, as they are the
enacted legislation or promulgated regulations. Thus there
were four basic sources in total: statements made in House and
Senate floor debates or in House and Senate committee hearings; House and Senate committee reports (including conference reports); the Code of Federal Regulations; and the United
States Code.85
We utilized the advance search tool within Lexis Advance
in order to validate our data on citations to legislative history
materials in courts of appeals majority opinions.86 These
this type of citation behavior. Instead, the source of these nonstandard citation
formats appears to be clerk-level effects, as a judge’s opinions may contain these
nonstandard citations in one term but not contain them in the following term.
84
There are many advantages for implementing an automated analysis of
majority opinions. First, a machine can efficiently analyze far more content than
would be feasible through a hand-coding or manual analysis. (The most extensive
hand-coding study conducted so far for opinions by federal appellate courts is the
United States Court of Appeals Database, JUD. RES. INITIATIVE, https://artsandsciences.sc.edu/poli/juri/appct.htm [https://perma.cc/XY8X-ECF6] (last visited
Feb 10, 2020), which manually analyzed 18,000 opinions published by the federal
courts of appeals between 1925 and 2002.) Second, our automation avoids selection bias because it canvasses the entire universe of published opinions within
our selected time range, rather than a possibly unrepresentative sample of opinions. Finally, machines are not prone to unconscious biases that exist within
human researchers. Even with procedures, codebooks, and intercoder reliability
checks, data coded by humans will always be prone to human error. The general
disadvantage of our automated technique is that the process is limited to the
parameters we specify. In other words, if we fail to specify a specific citation
format, those citations will not be identified.
85
Other types of legislative materials, such as concurrent and joint resolutions, were also identified and validated. Given the infrequent use of these materials in opinions by courts of appeals, we ultimately decided to omit these types of
materials from our study.
Statements in floor debates are cited ten times more often than statements in
committee hearings. We combined them into a single category because when
courts and commentators have discussed hearing statements, they have treated
them as similar to floor debates in their unreliability. See, e.g., S & E Contractors,
Inc. v United States, 406 U.S. 1, 13 n.9 (1972) (“[W]e have been extremely wary of
testimony before committee hearings and of debates on the floor of Congress.”);
supra note 13. As a robustness check, we calculated all the results presented in
this Article for floor statements and committee statements separately, and all the
substantive results were the same.
Citations to the Congressional Globe are included in the Floor Debate or
Committee Hearing category of legislative history materials. See supra note 12.
86
We also performed a second internal validation test to check across time
and circuits for extreme jumps and drops in the citation patterns. This process
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searches rely on a string-matching pattern to identify whether
an opinion contains a citation to a legislative history material
or not. If our searches in Lexis Advance revealed a number of
opinions citing a given legislative history material that is
smaller or larger than the number we gleaned from Mayer
Opinions, it would suggest that our search terms failed to accurately capture citations to legislative history materials.
Within Lexis Advance, we limited our searches to reported
opinions by federal courts of appeals and limited the range of
publication dates from January 1, 1965 to December 31, 2011.
The results by Lexis Advance yielded the same number of reported opinions as found when searching within Mayer Opinions, thus validating our data and the reliability of our method
for identifying citations to legislative materials within opinions.
We perform our analyses at the opinion level: this allows us
to determine whether, in a given majority opinion, there are
any citations to the relevant materials. We believe this is the
appropriate measure for two reasons. First, Justice Scalia’s
clear admonition was against citing legislative history, so the
key line is between citation and noncitation.87 Second, focusing on citation versus noncitation prevents the analysis being
skewed by a few opinions that contain a very large number of
citations to the relevant materials.
Table 1 depicts the distribution of majority opinions that
cite different types of materials along with the string-matching
searches used to identify the citations. Table 1 also identifies
what percent of the opinions that cite a specific type of legislative history were authored by a Republican judge.88

observed if there was a 20% increase (or decrease) in the number of opinions
citing legislative materials as compared to the previous year. We did this for each
type of legislative material that had more than 300 opinions citing the given type
(omitting Senate concurrent resolutions, House concurrent resolutions, Senate
joint resolutions, House joint resolutions, Senate documents, and House documents). The results of this internal validation indicate that there was no sudden
and inexplicable drop (or rise) in the number of opinions citing a type of legislative
material.
87
See supra note 57.
88
The searches implemented in Lexis Advance are not impacted by the punctuation found within the “Search Term(s)” column for Table 1. For example, “S.
Rep.” is akin to “S Rep” in the search. However, with regard to the regular
expressions used within the text of opinions, punctuation does matter. For this
reason, the regular expression analysis includes both “S. Rep.” and “S Rep.”
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TABLE 1: SEARCHES OF MATERIALS IN REPORTED MAJORITY
OPINIONS (1965–2011)
Type of Legislative
History Material

Search Term(s)

Number of % Authored by
Opinions* Republican Judge

Floor Debate or
Committee Hearing

“cong. rec” OR “congressional rec” OR
“cong. record” OR “cong. globe” OR
“statement of rep” OR “statement by
Rep” OR “statement of sen” OR “statement by sen” OR “statement of chair”
OR “statement by chair” OR “statement
of hon” OR “statement by hon” OR
“statement of representative” OR “statement by representative” OR “statement
of senator” OR “statement by senator”
OR “statement of honorable” OR “statement by honorable” OR “remarks of
rep” OR “remarks by Rep” OR “remarks
of sen” OR “remarks by sen” OR “remarks of chair” OR “remarks by chair”
OR “remarks of hon” OR “remarks by
hon” OR “remarks of representative”
OR “remarks by representative” OR “remarks of senator” OR “remarks by senator” OR “remarks of honorable” OR
“remarks by honorable” OR “comments
of rep” OR “comments by Rep” OR
“comments of sen” OR “comments by
sen” OR “comments of chair” OR “comments by chair” OR “comments of hon”
OR “comments by hon” OR “comments
of representative” OR “comments by
representative” OR “comments of senator” OR “comments by senator” OR
“comments of honorable” OR “comments by honorable” OR “hearing
before the committee” OR “hearing
before the comm” OR “hearing before
the subcommittee” OR “hearing before
the subcomm” OR “hearing on h.r” OR
“hearing on s.” OR “hearing before the
h” OR “comm. hearing” OR “hearing
before the s” OR “comm. hearing”

7,803

37.29%

Committee Report

“conf. rep” OR “conf. report” OR “h.r.
rep” OR “s. rep” OR “s.report” OR “h.
rep” OR “h.rep” OR “conference rep” OR
“senate rep” OR “house rep” OR “h.r.
report” OR “s. report” OR “h. r. report”
OR “h. r. report” OR “committee report”
OR “committee rep” OR “comm. rep”
OR “comm. report” OR “subcommittee
rep” OR “subcommittee report” OR
“subcomm. rep.” OR “subcomm. report”

30,215

56.36%

Code of Federal
Regulations

“C.F.R.”

41,749

50.84%

U.S. Code

“U.S.C.”

231,212

49.75%

*Number of majority opinions validated by Lexis Advance and with the aid of research
assistants.
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Table 1 presents aggregate data concerning the frequency
of citations to legislative materials in majority opinions.89 In
the next section we disaggregate the statistics from Table 1 to
observe more specific citation patterns by Democratic and Republican judges across time. We also employ a series of empirical approaches to test our hypotheses.
IV
RESULTS
First, we disaggregate the data and depict the frequency at
which each type of legislative history material is cited by Republican and Democratic appellate judges for each year in our
analysis.90 In each figure the x-axis represents the year the
opinions were published, the y-axis represents a count of the
89
We performed several samples of our results for citations to committee
reports (including conference reports) and committee hearings and found that
they accurately reflected citations to the relevant materials. The Congressional
Record, however, created a special challenge because of its mixed contents: the
Congressional Record contains House and Senate floor proceedings, transcripts of
floor debate and remarks, notice of all bills introduced, the text of bills (as passed
by a chamber, but usually not when introduced), full text of all conference committee reports, notices of committee and presidential actions and communications, and statements or documents submitted by members of Congress for
publication. Richard J. McKinney, An Overview of the Congressional Record and
Its Predecessor Publications: A Research Guide, LAW LIBR.’S SOC’Y WASH., D.C., (last
updated May 2019), https://www.llsdc.org/congressional-record-overview
[https://perma.cc/T6SH-7HNQ]. In addition, some materials from floor debates
are actually committee or conference reports or portions thereof (often section-bysection analyses produced by the relevant committee) that are inserted in the
record. With the help of two excellent research librarians, we reviewed all 457
majority opinions that referred to a conference report within 100 words of a
citation to the Congressional Record, in order to determine whether a given opinion cited both a conference report and a floor debate or instead cited a conference
report that was published in the Congressional Record. And, with the help of two
excellent research assistants, we reviewed each majority opinion that was identified in our textual analysis as containing a citation to the Congressional Record,
in the standard Bluebook format or not (using the search terms identified in Table
1). This examination yielded a total of 7,803 majority opinions citing the Congressional Record. Our research assistants reviewed each of these majority opinions
to determine if it cited a statement from a floor debate (that is, a statement or
remark by a Senator or Representative, not including the portions of such statements or remarks that were committee or conference reports or portions thereof).
The research assistants agreed on more than 99% of the cases that they both
coded, and we agreed with the coding of each research assistant in more than
99% of the cases.
90
The number of cases resolved by the courts of appeals each year generally
increases over the course of our study. See Statistics & Reports, U.S. COURTS,
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports [https://perma.cc/8M85-LPW7]
(last visited Feb. 10, 2020). We did not see a systematic increase in the cases that
are most likely to involve statutory interpretation (such as administrative law
cases). In any event, any increase in caseload (or particular kinds of cases) could
not explain our results on differing citation propensities.
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number of opinions that cite a given legislative history material, and the legend identifies Republican (black line) and Democratic (grey line) appellate judges.91
FIGURE 1: NUMBER OF MAJORITY OPINIONS CITING MATERIALS BY
PARTISANSHIP (1995–2011)
Opinions Citing Floor Debates or Committee Hearings
(1965–2011)
Opinion Author
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91
So the y-axis in Figure 1 reflects the total number of majority opinions
published in a given year citing a given material rather than the proportion of
opinions authored by Republican and Democratic judges for each year that cite a
given material. Figures 2, 3, and 4 focus on the average probability scores of
Republican and Democratic judges citing legislative history materials.
Note that the absolute number of citations to different materials varies dramatically (e.g., there are many more citations to the United States Code than to
floor debates or committee hearings). We are not presenting these figures to
highlight the differences in the number of citations to, say, the United States Code
as compared to citations to floor statements or committee hearings. Instead, we
are presenting them to highlight the relative changes within each type of material,
and thus we use scales designed to highlight such changes.
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Citations to statements from floor debates or committee
hearings are particularly striking, as they rose dramatically for
Republican and Democratic judges through the mid-1980s and
then equally dramatically decreased for Republican judges. As
for committee reports, in the mid-1980s Republican appellate
judges began to cite them more often than Democratic appellate judges and the trend continues for the rest of the period in
our study, with a significant increase by Republican judges in
the early 2000s. By contrast, there are no clear and prolonged
patterns for citations to the U.S. Code and the C.F.R.
One interesting aspect of these figures is that Republican
judges’ increase in citations to committee reports was much
greater than the increase in their citations to the U.S. Code:
comparing 1965 to 1985 opinions with 1986 to 2011 opinions,
the average number of Republicans’ majority opinions citing
committee reports went from 121 per year to 681 per year (a
462.8% increase), whereas the average number of Republicans’
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opinions citing the U.S. Code went from 1,399 per year to 3,292
per year (a 135.3% increase). This increase standing alone is
not particularly significant, but it is suggestive of a notable
increase in Republicans’ citations to committee reports, notwithstanding Justice Scalia’s hostility to all forms of legislative
history (and, indeed, his early singling out of committee reports
for particular condemnation).92
In order to assess the significance of the patterns observed
in Figure 1, we employ a range of statistical tests. These empirical tests can evaluate the predicted relationship between
Scalia’s attacks on legislative history materials and the decision to cite legislative history materials by appellate judges.
A.

Partisan Differences in Citation Behavior

As we noted above, our first hypothesis is that after Justice
Scalia’s attacks on legislative history materials there was a
non-random difference between Democratic and Republican
appellate judges’ citation of legislative history. This raises the
question of what years we should use for our comparison. We
chose as our main specification comparing majority opinions
published between 1965 and 1985 with majority opinions published between 1986 and 2011, on the theory that 1986 represents the most obvious break—it was the year that Scalia was
confirmed to the Supreme Court, after some public discussion
(including at his confirmation hearings) of his hostility to judicial invocation of legislative history. Thus 1986 was the most
obvious year when circuit judges (and circuit judge nominees)
would have become aware of the campaign against legislative
history and in favor of textualism.
We could have chosen other years as a breakpoint, and we
could have dropped data in the first few years after he joined
the Supreme Court, on the theory that it may have taken a few
years for his attacks to achieve widespread understanding. So
we ran each empirical test presented in this Part with alternative specifications for different sets of years. Specifically, our
first set of alternative specifications utilized different cutpoints,
comparing 1) opinions published from 1965 to 1987 against
opinions published from 1988 to 2011; 2) opinions published
from 1965 to 1989 against opinions published from 1990 to
2011; and 3) opinions published from 1965 to 1991 against
opinions published from 1992 to 2011. Our second set of alter92
See supra note 20 and accompanying text; infra notes 111–112 and accompanying text.
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native specifications omitted opinions that were published
from 1986 to 1988, opinions published from 1986 to 1990, and
opinions published from 1986 to 1992. That is, these estimations compared 1) opinions published from 1965 to 1985
against opinions published from 1989 to 2011; 2) opinions
published from 1965 to 1985 against opinions published from
1991 to 2011; and 3) opinions published from 1965 to 1985
against opinions published from 1993 to 2011. Under each
alternative specification, our primary results retain their statistical significance and substantive meanings.
Returning to our main specification, we first employ unpaired t-tests on two subsets from our data. The first subset
contains opinions published from 1965 to 1985 (the pre-Scalia
Effect time period), and the second contains opinions published from 1986 to 2011 (the post-Scalia Effect time period).
We perform an unpaired t-test for each type of legislative history material in our study to estimate whether there are statistically significant differences in citation behavior towards
legislative history materials between Democratic and Republican judges.93 Table 2 presents the results of each t-test.

93
In an alternative specification for the t-test results in Table 2, we calculated
the difference in the number of opinions by Democratic judges that cite a given
legislative history material and the number of opinions by Republican judges that
cite the same material for each year. We performed a set of unpaired t-test on
whether the annual differences were significantly different from one another in
the two time periods—pre- and post-Scalia’s ascension to the Supreme Court.
This specification allows us to test whether the differences in citation behavior
between Democratic and Republican judges were significantly different from one
another in the pre-Scalia period against the post-Scalia period (they were). The
results of this process can be found in section A of the Appendix.
If we had had reason to expect that there was an abrupt change in the citation
behavior in one particular year within the range of our study, we would have
performed a structural breaks test over the opinion data. However, we have no
reason to believe that there was a single relevant event. As we discussed in the
text, Scalia’s ascension to the Supreme Court is the best cutpoint, but his attacks
likely came to be known, and to be influential, over a period of time. Indeed, that
is why we performed the alternate specifications with different years that we note
in the text above.
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TABLE 2: T-TEST RESULTS: COMPARING DEMOCRATIC AND
REPUBLICAN JUDGES’ CITATION BEHAVIOR IN MAJORITY
OPINIONS IN THE PRE-SCALIA EFFECT PERIOD
(1965–1985)
Floor Debates
or Committee
Hearings

Committee
Reports

T-Score
(P-Value)

0.496
(0.623)

0.954
(0.345)

# of Opinions

3,455

5,280

46.97%

45.5%

% Authored by Rep.

Note: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1.

COMPARING DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN JUDGES’ CITATION
BEHAVIOR IN MAJORITY OPINIONS IN THE POST-SCALIA
EFFECT PERIOD (1986–2011)
Floor Debates
or Committee
Hearings

Committee
Reports

8.930***
(2.835e-11)

-2.349**
(0.023)

# of Opinions

4,348

24,935

% Authored by Rep.

28.8%

58.6%

T-Score
(P-Value)

Note: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1.

The tables reveal statistically significant divergences between Democratic and Republican judges’ citation practices
between 1986 and 2011 but no statistically significant difference in the earlier time period. Specifically, there are no statistically significant differences between Democratic and
Republican circuit judges’ majority opinions from 1965 to 1985
in their citations to statements from floor debates or committee
hearings or to committee reports, but there are significant differences between Democratic and Republican circuit judges’
citation behavior in majority opinions from 1986 to 2011.
Further, within the post-Scalia period t-tests, we observe a
positive and statistically significant t-score for the t-test concerning citations to floor debates or committee hearings and a
negative and statistically significant t-score for the t-test for
citations to committee. The direction of the t-scores suggests
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that, on average, in the post-Scalia time period Democratic
judges cited floor debates or committee hearings more often,
and committee reports less often, than their Republican
counterparts.
As a complement to the results in Table 2, we calculate the
average probability that a Democratic and a Republican judge
within our data would cite each type of legislative history material in an opinion before and after the Scalia Effect. The purpose of this analysis is to take into account changes in the ratio
of Democratic to Republican judges in the Courts of Appeals.
We want to determine whether the citation behavior trends we
observe in Figure 1 and Table 2 are driven by partisan differences rather than differences in the population sizes of Democratic and Republican appellate judges. We first divide all
opinions into pre-Scalia Effect (1965–1985) and post-Scalia Effect (1986–2011) categories, and then subdivide them into a
Republican author group and a Democratic author group. We
calculate the probability of citing a given legislative history material by dividing the number of published opinions citing a
given legislative history material by the number of published
opinions within each partisan group for each time period.94
The resulting score ranges from zero to one, with higher scores
implying that a judge is more likely to cite a given legislative
history material.95 Given this calculation, the resulting estimate can also be interpreted as the average probability that a
Democratic judge or a Republican judge in our study would cite
a given legislative history material. Further, the estimated
scores can also be referred to as propensity scores, as the estimated scores depict and represent the mean observed citation
behavior for each type of judge. Figure 2 presents the average
probability scores estimated in each calculation.

94
This calculation assumes that, on average, a Democratic judge and a Republican judge will author a similar number of published opinions each year.
95
This calculation does not provide us with a measure of uncertainty for the
point estimates, and for this reason there are no confidence intervals included in
the figure.
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FIGURE 2: AVERAGE PROBABILITY OF A GIVEN JUDGE CITING
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY MATERIALS IN A MAJORITY OPINION:
PRE-SCALIA EFFECT AND POST-SCALIA EFFECT
Floor Debates or Committee Hearings

Committee Reports
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The visualizations in Figure 2 suggest that the average
probability that a Republican judge would cite statements from
floor debates or committee hearings decreased following
Scalia’s attacks on legislative history. By contrast, the average
probability that a Democratic judge would cite such statements
in her opinions was almost identical in both time periods. Importantly, the result suggests that the observed differences in
citation of floor debates or committee hearings between Democratic and Republican judges are not simply driven by the ratio
of Republican to Democratic judges.
Further, Figure 2 suggests that in the pre-Scalia Effect
time period the average Democratic judge and the average Republican judge had very similar propensities to cite committee
reports in majority opinions. In the post-Scalia Effect time period, the average probability for both types of judges of citing
committee reports dramatically increased, with a larger increase for Republican judges. Overall, Figure 2 supports the
estimated statistical differences in citation behavior between
Democratic and Republican appellate judges found in Table 2
and provides further evidence that the results in Table 2 are
not simply driven by changes in the composition of the appellate bench.
B.

Presidential Cohort Effects on Citation Patterns

Our second hypothesis predicts that judges nominated by
a President who came before Reagan (pre-Reagan Cohort)
would be more likely to cite legislative history materials than
their counterparts appointed by Reagan and later Presidents
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(post-Reagan Cohort).96 We estimate another set of unpaired ttests in order to test this hypothesis. We perform an unpaired
t-test for each type of legislative history material in our study to
estimate whether there are statistically significant differences
in citation of legislative history materials between judges from
the pre-Reagan cohort compared to judges from the post-Reagan cohort.97 Table 3 presents the results of each t-test.98
96
We also tested this hypothesis with a set of pairwise t-tests comparing the
number of opinions by each presidential cohort that cited legislative history
materials. We observed, for example, that Nixon judges’ citation of statements
from floor debates or committee hearings is statistically distinct from the more
recent Republican cohorts. While the results provide evidence of statistically
significant non-random differences in the citation behavior across older and
newer presidential cohorts, the tests cannot tell us which cohorts will cite certain
legislative history materials more or less often. For this reason, we also calculated
the average probability that a judge from each presidential cohort would cite floor
debates or committee hearings along with the average probability that a judge
from each cohort would cite committee reports. The results of each pairwise t-test
and the calculated average probability scores by cohort are in section B of the
Appendix.
97
In an alternative specification for the t-test results in Table 3, we employed
a 1986 cutpoint as the start of the post-Reagan cohort instead of a cutpoint of
1981. The empirical and substantive results of Table 3 held under this alternative
specification.
98
There are two rather important considerations that we addressed in a
robustness check of our results. The first involves the D.C. Circuit, which hears a
disproportionate percentage of cases involving statutory interpretation. The second is on the role of the Chevron doctrine, which changed the methodology a judge
would apply to determine whether to accept an agency’s legal interpretation of the
statute it administers. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837 (1984).
As to the former, we replicated our primary results in Table 3 while omitting
D.C. Circuit opinions. The estimated coefficients for the Scalia Effect variable
retained the same direction and level of statistical significance for each replication
model. This finding indicates that the citation behavior of D.C. Circuit judges is
not driving our results in Table 3.
To perform a robustness check with respect to Chevron, we ran a series of
unpaired t-tests comparing Democratic judges’ and Republican judges’ citations
in their majority opinions in the following categories: 1) all opinions from 2003 to
2011; 2) opinions citing Chevron; 3) opinions citing but not applying Chevron; and
4) opinions citing and applying Chevron. Our general findings of observed differences between Democratic and Republican judges replicate for this specific time
period (2003-2011). Likewise, our statistical findings of meaningful differences in
citations of floor debates or committee hearings by Republican and Democratic
judges hold across each specification with respect to the Chevron doctrine. With
regard to committee reports, the statistically significant difference in citation behavior between Democratic and Republican judges goes away when we narrow
our focus to opinions citing committee reports and citing the Chevron doctrine.
Similarly, our statistically significant finding goes away when we narrow our focus
to opinions citing committee reports and citing and applying the Chevron doctrine. However, for opinions citing committee reports and Chevron but not applying the Chevron doctrine, the statistically significant difference between
Democratic and Republican appellate judges reappears. These results are in
section C of the Appendix.
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TABLE 3: T-TEST RESULTS: COMPARING PRE-AND POST-REAGAN
JUDGES’ CITATION BEHAVIOR IN MAJORITY OPINIONS
(1965–2011)
Floor Debates
or Committee
Hearings
T-Score
(P-Value)

Committee
Reports

-7.753***
(1.567e-12)

4.238***
(9.074e-05)

# of Opinions

7,803

30,215

% Authored by
Post-Reagan Cohort

17.0%

51.3%

Note: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1.

Table 3 reveals statistically significant divergences between
pre-Reagan and post-Reagan judges’ citation practices. Specifically, there are statistically significant differences between
pre- and post-Reagan circuit judges’ majority opinions in their
citations to statements from floor debates or committee hearings and to committee reports.
As with the t-tests in Table 2 for ideology, these results in
Table 3 for presidential cohorts provide statistical evidence that
Scalia’s attacks on legislative history and advocacy of textualism are associated with differences among the cohorts’ citation
of these legislative history materials.
To extend our findings in Table 3, we calculate the average
probability that a judge from each cohort would cite each type
of legislative history material. For each cohort, we calculate the
probability of citing a given legislative history material by dividing the number of opinions citing a given legislative history
material by the number of published opinions.99 The resulting
estimate ranges from zero to one, with higher scores suggesting
a higher probability of a citation to a given legislative history
material. The resulting estimate indicates the probability that
the average judge from within a cohort would cite a given legislative history material in a given opinion. As we noted above,
these estimated scores are also referred to as propensity
scores, as the estimated scores depict and represent the mean
99
This calculation assumes that, on average, each pre-Reagan and postReagan judge will author a similar number of published opinions each year,
regardless of whether she is a Democrat or Republican. This calculation does not
yield a measure of uncertainty for the point estimates, and thus there are no
confidence intervals included in the figure.
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observed citation behavior for each cohort. Figure 3 presents
the estimated scores.100
FIGURE 3: AVERAGE PROBABILITY OF A GIVEN JUDGE CITING
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY MATERIALS IN A MAJORITY OPINION:
PRE-REAGAN COHORT AND POST-REAGAN
COHORT
Floor Debates or Committee Hearings

Committee Reports
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0.15

0.10

•
0.05

•
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The visualizations in Figure 3 suggest that the average
probability of citing statements from floor debates or committee
hearings is smaller for a judge in the post-Reagan cohort as
compared to a judge in the pre-Reagan cohort, and the reverse
is true for committee reports. Thus Figure 3 indicates that the
pre-Reagan cohort and the post-Reagan cohort exhibit different
citation behaviors towards legislative history.
In order to determine if there is an underlying partisan
dimension within each cohort driving the average probability
scores in Figure 3 and the results in Table 3, we disaggregate
the pre- and post-Reagan cohorts based on the political party
of the President appointing the judge.101 Figure 4 presents
these estimated scores.102
100
As we noted above, we chose to use Reagan as the dividing line on the
theory that even pre-1986 Reagan judges had fewer opportunities to decide statutory interpretation cases and thus might be more persuadable. But in light of our
use of 1986 as a cutpoint for the Scalia Effect in our first hypothesis, we checked
the robustness of our scores by treating Reagan judges nominated in 1986 or
earlier as a part of the pre-Reagan cohort. The substantive probability scores
changed very little.
101
This calculation functionally operates the same as the previous estimation
of average probability scores. See supra note 99.
102
As with the previous analogous estimation, supra note 100, we checked the
robustness of our scores by treating Reagan judges nominated in 1986 or earlier
as a part of the pre-Reagan cohort. The substantive average probability scores

R
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FIGURE 4: AVERAGE PROBABILITY OF A GIVEN JUDGE CITING
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY MATERIALS IN A MAJORITY OPINION
BY PARTISANSHIP AND COHORT
Floor Debates or Committee Hearings
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Figure 4 suggests that post-Reagan Republican judges
have a lower average probability of citing statements from floor
debates or committee hearings than pre-Reagan Republican
judges. The same is true of pre- and post-Reagan Democratic
judges. This finding supports our prediction in our second
hypothesis, as both Democratic and Republican judges in the
post-Reagan cohort are less likely to cite statements from floor
debates or committee hearings than their counterparts in the
pre-Reagan cohort. Notably, when we compare the estimated
scores across the pre-Reagan and post-Reagan cohorts, the
(slightly) larger difference in citations to statements from floor
debates or committee hearings is among the Republican
judges.103 The results with respect to committee reports are
more dramatic. Republican judges have a larger difference in
their pre- and post-Reagan cohorts than do Democratic judges.
changed very little. This robustness check included a re-estimation of the scores
found in Figure 4 under this alternative specification. The results retained the
same substantive meaning.
We considered relying on a difference-in-differences estimation (DID), but we
had concerns over violating the parallel trends assumption entailed in DID. PostReagan judges joined the bench in 1981 or thereafter, so a DID estimation comparing pre- and post-Reagan judges makes sense only for the post-1980 period,
rather than the 1965 to 2011 period that our data covers. That said, we performed DID estimations for the 1981 to 2011 period. The results conform to the
estimations presented in Figure 4.
103
When compared, Republican judges in the pre-Reagan cohort have a 0.036
probability of citing floor debates or committee hearings, whereas Republican
judges in the post-Reagan cohort have a 0.020 probability—a difference of 0.016.
Democratic judges in the pre-Reagan cohort have a 0.061 probability of citing
floor debates or committee hearings, whereas Democratic judges in the postReagan cohort have a 0.047 probability—a difference of 0.015.
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Interestingly, the propensity to cite committee reports is highest for the post-Reagan Republican cohort.
The results thus far indicate that judges appointed before
Reagan differ from judges appointed by Reagan or thereafter,
and that this difference exists both for Republican and Democratic judges. The differences between Republican and Democratic judges are not as striking as the commonalities among
them: pre-Reagan Republican and Democratic judges are more
likely to cite statements from floor debates or committee hearings, and less likely to cite committee reports, than Republican
and Democratic judges appointed by Reagan or thereafter.104
Figure 1 displays the number of opinions citing legislative
history materials before and after Scalia’s attacks. In Figure 5
we disaggregate those numbers by presidential cohort and partisanship. This allows a comparison of pre-Reagan Republicans with pre-Reagan Democrats, and post-Reagan
Republicans with post-Reagan Democrats. These figures are
not propensity scores, but instead display total numbers of
opinions in each category. Importantly, the pre-Reagan cohort
is shrinking in the later time periods in Figure 5 due to deaths
and retirements. This helps explain why the total number of
opinions authored by pre-Reagan judges citing legislative history materials (or anything else, for that matter) dwindles. It
also suggests that comparisons in Figure 5 between judges
from different presidential cohorts may be less meaningful
than comparisons within presidential cohorts.
FIGURE 5: NUMBER OF MAJORITY OPINIONS CITING MATERIALS BY
PARTISANSHIP AND COHORT (1965–2011)
Opinions Citing Floor Debates or Committee Hearings by PreReagan Judges (1965–2011)
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We include data disaggregated for each appointing President in section B of
the Appendix.
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The visualizations in Figure 5 demonstrate that pre-Reagan Democratic authors cite floor debates or committee hearings more often than pre-Reagan Republican judges do. And
post-Reagan Democratic authors similarly cite floor debates or
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committee hearings more than post-Reagan Republican judges
do.
Turning to committee reports, there is a relatively stable
number of opinions authored by pre-Reagan Democratic and
Republican judges citing such reports across the entire time
period of interest. By contrast, there was an explosion of opinions citing committee reports for post-Reagan Democratic and
Republican judges in the mid-2000s. And the rise was particularly striking for post-Reagan Republican judges.105
105
When Figure 5 is replicated with the percentage, rather than the number,
of all majority opinions that cite a particular type of legislative history, the same
substantive patterns of citation behavior arise. In Figure 5 we present the number instead of the percentage of opinions to maintain consistency with Figure 1.
We performed four additional regressions over our data as additional specifications. The first two regressions addressed our empirical results in Table 2 and
the second addressed the results in Table 3. The first regression is a logistic
regression with the opinion as the unit of analysis and whether a specific type of
legislative history is cited or not as the binary dependent variable. The independent variables are also binary and interact within the regression. The first independent variable is whether the authoring judge is Democratic or Republican, and
the second is whether the opinion was written before or after the Scalia Effect.
The second regression is a negative binomial. The unit of analysis is at the year
and circuit level. The dependent variable of interest is a count of the number of
opinions authored each year within each circuit that cite a specific legislative
history material. Once again, two binary variables that identify the partisanship
of the authoring judge and the time period (pre- or post-Scalia effect) are included
in the regression and interacted. The third regression is a logistic regression with
the same unit of analysis and dependent variable design as the previous logistic
regression, with the exception that the interacted independent variable for the
Scalia Effect is replaced by an independent variable for pre- versus post-Reagan
judges. That is, the first independent variable remains the same (whether the
authoring judge is Democratic or Republican), and the only change is substituting
the judicial cohort for the year Scalia joined the Court, in line with the difference
in focus between Table 2 and Table 3. The final regression is a negative binomial
regression with the same unit of analysis and dependent variable design as the
previous negative binomial regression, with the exception that the interacted independent variables concern the partisanship of the authoring judge and the preversus post-Reagan cohort of the authoring judge (again, corresponding to the
difference in focus between Table 2 and Table 3). The results of each regression
support the substantive and empirical findings presented in Figures 1, 2, 3, 4,
and 5 and in Tables 2 and 3. More broadly, the results of the first and second
regressions provide statistically significant empirical support for our findings in
this Article with respect to judges’ partisanship and citation behavior, and the
results of the third and fourth regressions provide statistically significant empirical support for our findings in this Article with respect to judges’ cohort and
citation behavior.
If we had had reason to suspect irregular citation behaviors from year to year,
we would have interacted the partisanship variable with the year the opinion was
published. Such a specification could mitigate bias introduced if irregular behavior in one year confounded the interpretation of the partisanship variable. For our
data, however, Figure 1 and subsequent analyses indicate that there were relatively steady and predictable changes from year to year within the range of our
study.
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With respect to the visualizations in Figures 4 and 5 and
the empirical results in Table 3, it is important to highlight that
when we control for the political party of the judges, the differences in citation behavior among pre- and post-Reagan cohorts
are significant. And when we control for pre- and post-Reagan
cohorts, the differences in citation behavior between Democratic and Republican judges are also significant. This leads us
to conclude that the political party of a judge and the cohort
have independent impacts on judges’ citation behavior.
V
IMPLICATIONS
In the mid-1980s Antonin Scalia launched a campaign
against judges invoking legislative history in statutory interpretation. He said that what mattered was the text that Congress
voted on, and legislative history was irrelevant. His attacks
soon gained widespread notice and followers, helped by his
prominence as a Justice and the sharpness and relentlessness
of his attacks. The resulting debate over the use of legislative
history, and textualism versus purposivism more generally,
was the central debate in statutory interpretation. In this Article, we have examined the effect of Scalia’s attacks, in light of
the facts that, first, there was an ideological valence to judges’
public reactions to those attacks and, second, some judges had
been deciding cases long before Scalia’s attacks began. We
hypothesized that Republican circuit judges would respond to
the attacks more than Democratic circuit judges, and that circuit judges nominated by Reagan or later Presidents (post-Reagan) would respond more than pre-Reagan judges.
In an additional set of separate regressions, we also considered whether some
judge-level characteristics of the authoring judge beyond political party and presidential cohort correlate with citations to legislative history materials. Relying on
biographical data from the Federal Judiciary Center, we were able to identify for
each judge the year she joined the appellate bench, her gender, and the law school
she attended. As to the latter, following Epstein, Landes, and Posner, we compared Yale Law and Harvard Law graduates to the graduates of other law schools.
LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES, & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL
JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 355–56 (2013). We
found that, controlling for political party, the more recently a judge joined the
bench the less likely she was to cite floor debates or committee hearings, and the
more likely she was to cite committee reports. As for education, judges from Yale
and Harvard were slightly less likely to cite floor debates or committee hearings
than were other judges. The regression results also revealed no statistically significant difference between citation to committee reports by graduates from Yale
and Harvard and such citations by graduates of other law schools. Further, we
found no statistically significant correlation between gender and citation of any
type of legislative history materials.
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Specifically, we hypothesized that Republican and post-Reagan
judges would be less likely to cite legislative history. What we
found is more nuanced: Republican judges and post-Reagan
judges were less likely to cite statements from floor debates or
committee hearings, but they were more likely to cite committee reports (including conference reports).
So, how do we explain these results? One seeming possibility, which we did not hypothesize, involves control of Congress and a particular application of judicial ideology. As we
noted above, between 1933 and 1980, Democrats controlled
the Senate for all but four years, and between 1933 and 1994,
the Democrats controlled the House for all but four years.106
So through the 1970s, citing committee reports was likely to
entail citing reports written under the auspices of Democratic
leadership, whereas floor statements could come from any
member of Congress. A judge who wanted to invoke Republican representatives’ views thus might switch from floor statements to committee reports after Republicans started
controlling committee reports.
This possible reason for a switch to committee reports
would not explain the behavior of Democratic judges: there is
no reason to believe that post-Reagan Democratic judges
wanted to cite committee reports more, and floor statements
less, than their pre-Reagan Democratic counterparts because
that way they would be citing Republican representatives. As
for Republican judges, note that this explanation entails affected circuit judges being more ideologically conservative, or
perhaps more short-term ideologically conservative, than
Scalia. After all, Scalia advocated against invocation of legislative history, and he started his campaign in 1985—the fifth
year of Republican control of the Senate. So judges who
switched from citing floor statements to citing committee reports in order to cite Republicans were either more ideological
than Scalia or more focused on immediate implementation of
ideology. Scalia is usually considered to be on one end of the
ideological spectrum, but this explanation entails many circuit
judges who were nontrivially more ideological than he was,
which is certainly conceivable, but there is no evidence that
Republican judges were more ideologically conservative than
Scalia was.
The history of party control during our time period provides
an opportunity to test this explanation. After decades of Demo106

See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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cratic control, Republicans controlled the Senate from 1981 to
1987, but the House remained out of their reach until 1995. If
Republican judges’ move to citation of committee reports reflected their desire to cite Republicans in Congress, then we
would expect a sharper increase in Republicans’ citations to
Senate committee reports in the years during and immediately
after Republican control of the Senate than in their citations to
House committee reports. Others have found that most citations to legislative materials occur within six years of legislative
passage, so if Republican judges wanted to cite Republican
Senators we should see a spike in citations to Senate and not
House reports in the years 1981 to 1990.107 But in fact when
we compare citations from 1975 to 1980 with citations from
1981 to 1990, we find no statistically significant difference in
the increase in the average probability score of a Republican
judge citing a Senate committee report as compared to a House
committee report.108 A second test focuses more specifically on
post-Reagan Republican judges: if such judges were inclined to
cite Republicans in Congress, we would expect a sharper increase in their citations to House committee reports in the
years after the Republicans gained control of the House in 1995
than in their citation to Senate reports. So we can compare
post-Reagan Republicans’ citations to each house’s committee
reports in the 1981 to 1994 period with their citations in the
1995 to 2008 period. We find no statistically significant difference in the increase in the average probability score of a postReagan Republican judge citing a House committee report as
compared to a Senate committee report.109 These findings,
combined with the lack of evidence that Republican judges
107
See John M. de Figueiredo & Edward H. Stiglitz, Signing Statements and
Presidentializing Legislative History, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 841, 855–56 (2017).
108
To allow for a time lag after the Republican takeover of the Senate in 1981,
and as a robustness check, we also compared citations from 1975 to 1980 with
citations from 1984 to 1990. We found no statistically significant difference in the
increase in the average probability score of a Republican judge citing a Senate
committee report as compared to a House committee report.
109
As another robustness check, we allowed for a time lag, this time after the
Republican takeover of the House in 1995: we compared post-Reagan Republicans’ citations to committee reports in the 1981 to 1994 period with their citations
in the 1998 to 2008 period. Again, we found no statistically significant difference
in the increase in the average probability score of a post-Reagan Republican judge
citing a House committee report as compared to a Senate committee report. We
performed similar robustness checks for all Republican judges (pre- and postReagan)—one comparing committee report citations from 1981 to 1994 with those
from 1995 to 2008, and another comparing such citations from 1981 to 1994 with
those from 1998 to 2008. As with the robustness checks for post-Reagan Republican judges, there were no statistically significant differences in either
calculation.
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were more ideologically conservative than Scalia, lead us to
conclude that a desire to cite Republican Senators is not driving our results on Republican judges’ citation patterns.110
We find a different explanation more persuasive, although
we cannot prove it with our data. We think that our results—
which, recall, are only partially consistent with our original
hypotheses—make sense in light of what happened both before
and after Scalia launched his campaign. For most of the twentieth century, there was a broad consensus on the hierarchy of
legislative history materials noted above. Then, in the 1970s
through the mid-1980s there was an explosion in citations to
statements from floor debates and committee hearings, but no
similar explosion in citations to committee reports. The hierarchy of legislative history apparently had lost some of its force.
Scalia and others’ attacks on legislative history seem to
have destabilized, at least for some judges, the practices that
were getting established in the 1970s and early 1980s. And
that destabilization seems to have had a greater impact on the
judges that we hypothesize would be most likely to be
influenced.
But there were two competing sides in the debate in the
mid-1980s and thereafter: textualists like Scalia who said that
legislative history should generally be ignored, and
purposivists who said that judges should start with the statutory language but should be willing to look to reliable legislative
110
Another alternative hypothesis involves lawyers’ supply of citations to circuit judges: perhaps at least one side in a case usually will have an incentive to
cite legislative history, so that lawyers usually will present legislative history in
their briefs; and insofar as judges’ opinions reflect what is in lawyers’ briefs, the
judges’ opinions will thus cite legislative history. Holding aside the degree to
which opinions include all the arguments and citations in lawyers’ briefs, this
hypothesis would not explain our results. If we had found no differences in the
Republicans’ and post-Reagan judges’ citations relative to their counterparts,
then this hypothesis might be tenable. But this hypothesis cannot explain the
differences we find. Similarly, if one posited that lawyers are more likely to cite a
particular kind of legislative history in particular kinds of cases that might have
increased or decreased over the period of our study (e.g., a category of case that
might have risen in the post-Scalia period), that might conceivably explain a rise
or fall in citations to a particular kind of legislative history among all judges. But
because panel selection of judges for a given case is blind to their political party, it
would not explain the differences we find. We suppose that one could attribute an
extraordinary level of clairvoyance to lawyers in knowing that, for instance, Republican judges would be relatively more likely to cite committee reports than
their Democratic counterparts despite Scalia’s attacks (and even greater clairvoyance in knowing not only who would be on their panel but also who on that panel
would write the majority opinion), but that strains credulity, especially as no one
before this Article has hypothesized (much less found) the divergence in the citation of committee reports versus floor statements or committee hearings that we
find in this Article.
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history if there were statutory ambiguities. These purposivists
usually invoked the hierarchy of legislative history materials
that courts and commentators had regularly invoked through
the 1960s, with committee reports at the top and statements
from floor debates and committee hearings far below.
One might have expected—and we hypothesized—that Republican and post-Reagan judges would have tended to follow
Scalia’s lead and cite legislative history much less than their
Democratic and pre-Reagan counterparts (who would have
tended to cite all forms of legislative history). But in this Article
we find that Republican and post-Reagan judges adopted practices more in line with ideological liberals like Judges Mikva
and Wald who rejected Scalia’s blanket opposition than with
Scalia himself. The Republican and post-Reagan judges were
less likely than their counterparts to engage in the practice,
which had been common in the 1970s, of citing statements
from floor debates or committee hearings; but they were more
likely than their counterparts to cite committee reports. In this
way, these judges helped to revive the approach to legislative
history that prevailed until the 1970s and was later championed by Scalia’s opponents. The anti-legislative-history movement led by Scalia seems to have shifted the debate, and the
Republican and post-Reagan judges also shifted. Their shift,
however, was to the modified purposivism that responded to
Scalia’s critiques and had prevailed until the 1970s, not to the
broader rejection of legislative history that Scalia advocated.
The fact that Republican and post-Reagan judges were
more likely than their counterparts to cite committee reports is
particularly ironic in light of Scalia’s earliest attacks on legislative history: as we noted above, in his first writings expressing
doubt about legislative history, he stated that he was more
skeptical of committee reports than of other forms of legislative
history.111 As he said (after discussing other forms of legislative history) in a speech he gave at many law schools between
the fall of 1985 and the spring of 1986, “At the bottom of the list
I would place—what hitherto seems to have been placed at the
top: the committee report.”112 Despite Scalia’s placement of
committee reports at the bottom of the hierarchy of legislative
history materials, Republican and post-Reagan judges became
more likely than their counterparts to cite these reports, even
as they were less likely to cite floor statements or committee
hearings. They appear to have accepted the hierarchy of legis111
112

See supra note 20.
Farber & Frickey, supra note 20, at 442 n.64 (excerpting this speech).
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lative materials that had previously prevailed—and that Scalia
had rejected.113
This Article thus has three significant implications. First,
influence on judges was heavily based on their political party
and their pre-existing experience engaging in judicial statutory
interpretation. Republican judges were more influenced by the
113
This does not necessarily mean that judges’ citation practices were sincere,
in the sense that they were citing materials that they believed should be cited. It
is possible that their practices were insincere because they were strategically
aimed at the Supreme Court, which might review any of their decisions: perhaps
circuit judges cited materials based on what they thought the Supreme Court
Justices wanted to see. If so, judges’ citation practices reflect not persuasion but
a desire to please the Supreme Court.
There is no way to know whether such insincerity explains our results, but it
seems quite unlikely. Either all judges behaved strategically by citing materials
insincerely (that is, to please the Supreme Court), in which case there is a puzzling divergence between what Republican and post-Reagan judges regarded as
good strategy and what Democratic and pre-Reagan judges considered good strategy, or only one set of judges (Republican and post-Reagan or Democratic and
pre-Reagan) was engaged in such insincere strategic behavior. The first possibility (with all judges citing materials in order to please the Supreme Court) might
conceivably help to explain a consistent rise (or fall) in citations to legislative
history (or even some types of legislative history) among all judges if the Supreme
Court moved from one approach to legislative history to a different one. But it
cannot explain the divergence we observe unless one further supposes that these
sets of judges systematically reached different conclusions regarding what strategic citation behavior entailed. This possible explanation seems particularly problematic for the divergence between Democratic and Republican judges, whose
citation behavior did not significantly differ pre-Scalia but did significantly differ
post-Scalia. We would have to assume that they agreed on good citation strategy
pre-Scalia but disagreed post-Scalia.
The second possibility assumes that Republican and post-Reagan (or, conversely, Democratic and pre-Reagan) judges behaved significantly more insincerely than their counterparts—and, in fact, Republican or Democratic (but not
both) judges were not insincere pre-Scalia, but became insincere post-Scalia. We
have no basis for positing a divergence in judges’ taste for insincere citation
behavior, much less for it arising only for either Democrats or Republicans postScalia. Beyond that, we also note that neither side of the divergence between
Democrats and Republicans and between pre- and post-Reagan judges is obviously the strategic one, in terms of pleasing the Supreme Court. Being more likely
to cite committee reports but less likely to cite floor statements might appeal to
some Justices in this period, but it might displease others (not only Scalia and
presumably Thomas but also Justices who were happy to cite floor statements).
And insofar as ideology might play a role, it seems strange that Republican
judges, relative to their Democratic counterparts, adopted a citation practice that
would be more associated with moderate Democrats than with conservative
Republicans. As we initially hypothesized in this Article, the more obvious result
of ideology would be to push Republicans to cite all forms of legislative history less
often than their Democratic counterparts.
All that said, we cannot rule out the possibility that our results reflect judges
citing materials simply to please the Supreme Court. And if we could know the
extent of that insincerity, it would shed additional light not only on the phenomena we find but also on larger questions involving judicial behavior. Ultimately,
though, this possibility seems interesting but, in light of our data, highly
improbable.
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attacks on legislative history than were their Democratic counterparts. Independent of that ideological impact, judges who
began serving during or after Scalia’s attacks were more influenced than were their earlier-appointed counterparts. And, reflecting the independence of these two effects, the combination
of them was particularly powerful: the effect for Republican
post-Reagan judges was greater than for Republicans alone or
post-Reagan judges alone.
Second, a single Justice was able to have a remarkable
influence on judicial interpretation. Most Justices are part of
larger coalitions that, over many years, push judicial behavior
in one direction or another. But this was a campaign led by a
single Justice, and it had a fairly quick and dramatic effect—
and one that has persisted. Other judges (and later Justice
Thomas) joined Scalia’s crusade, though generally not with the
same rejection of the invocation of legislative history.114 Scalia
was the acknowledged leader, and, as our data show, the crusade against legislative history had effects that were immediate
and long-lasting, in addition to being significant. There may
have been other Justices who had a similar impact on some
aspect of judicial behavior, but they have been few and far
between. John Marshall is the most obvious candidate, but it
is not clear how many others there are. As Justice Kagan noted
in the quotation at the beginning of this article, Justice Scalia’s
influence on statutory interpretation was exceptional.115
But, third, the impact of Scalia’s campaign was mixed. He
put the issue on the table, spurring judges (and lawyers and
law professors) to consider ignoring legislative history, and
more generally to think about how and why they would treat
legislative history. That is an enormous impact. But the response to his attacks seems to have been that the most affected
judges jettisoned floor and hearing statements, a form of legislative history widely considered fairly unreliable, but embraced
committee reports, a form of legislative history that had been
considered reliable—by the lights of those who were willing to
invoke legislative history. Scalia’s campaign was able to stimulate a rethinking, but not an adoption of his approach. That he
was able to spur this rethinking is remarkable. He did not,
however, achieve his goal of eliminating virtually every invocation of legislative history.
The bottom line from our data and analyses is that ideology
matters, as does becoming a judge in the era before textualists
114
115

See supra notes 22–27 and accompanying text.
See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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started arguing against legislative history: the data show
meaningful differences based on political party and pre- versus
post-Reagan cohort. But the nature of the impact was not
what Scalia wanted. The judges most influenced by his attacks
seem to have (re)considered the role for legislative history and
decided to adopt the pre-1970s consensus. From his perspective, his impact was paradoxical, in the sense of being selfcontradictory: the judges his attacks most influenced accepted
one element of his critique and rejected another element, even
though he conceptualized those elements as part and parcel of
a coherent textualist whole. He wanted to convince judges to
adopt textualism, but they did not. He influenced, but he did
not persuade.
CONCLUSION
We began this article with a quotation from Justice Kagan
that Justice Scalia “taught everybody how to do statutory interpretation differently” and that “we’re all textualists now.”116
How do we assess those claims, and the success of Scalia’s
campaign against legislative history?
One way of looking at the data we present is that Scalia
had meaningful success—he got half a loaf, and half a loaf is
significant. He attacked a practice he deemed unprincipled,
and although circuit judges did not wholly accept his prescription, Republican and post-Reagan circuit judges who might be
expected to be more influenced by Scalia did become more
careful than their counterparts in their invocation of legislative
history. He thus managed to destabilize the prevailing norms
and push many judges to think more carefully about their use
of legislative history.
On a different view, many judges may have been influenced
by Scalia’s critique of the prevailing approach to legislative history, but they rejected his categorical hostility to it. Under
Scalia’s approach, judges should treat legislative history as basically irrelevant. Prominent liberal judges responded that legislative purpose is relevant, and that there is a principled way
of invoking legislative history that looks more to committee
reports and less to floor debates and statements at committee
hearings. This debate led judges, and in particular Republican
and post-Reagan judges, to consider these issues, and they
sided with the prominent liberal judges: they concluded that
116

Id.
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text alone was not sufficient, and that committee reports
should be invoked. On this view, Scalia largely failed.
Part of the choice between these positions depends on unknowable considerations. For instance, what would have happened if there had been no attacks on the use of legislative
history? Perhaps liberal judges and law professors would have
been happy for the 1970s pattern to persist, and so absent
those attacks they would not have advocated for the pre-1970s
consensus. And maybe the legislative history practices of the
1970s would have continued. Under those circumstances, we
would say that the Scalia-led attacks on legislative history were
fairly successful, because they brought about the rethinking
among liberal judges and law professors noted above, and
spurred the movement away from the least reliable forms of
legislative history. On the other hand, perhaps even in the
absence of any attacks on legislative history liberal judges and
law professors would have made the same arguments for the
pre-1970s consensus, and perhaps those arguments would
have been exactly as successful as they turned out to be in
reality. In that scenario, Scalia’s arguments against legislative
history achieved nothing, as the same result would have occurred had Scalia never launched any attacks.
These scenarios, as counterfactuals, are of course unprovable. Beyond that, a conclusion about the degree to which
Scalia succeeded or failed also depends on judgment calls with
no obvious metric—notably, how much weight one puts on the
influenced judges’ decrease in citations to floor debates or committee hearings versus their increase in citations to committee
reports.
Thus the best answer to the question whether Scalia
achieved modest success or instead failed is yes.
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Appendix:
The Paradoxical Impact of Scalia’s Campaign
Against Legislative History
Stuart Minor Benjamin and Kristen M. Renberg
A.
ALTERNATIVE TEST OF DIFFERENCES IN CITATION BEHAVIOR
BETWEEN DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN JUDGES
As an alternative specification for the unpaired t-test results in Table 2, we first calculated the difference in the number of opinions published by Democratic judges citing a given
legislative history material and the number of opinions published by Republican judges citing the same material for each
year. We performed a set of unpaired t-tests on whether the
annual differences were significantly different from one another
in the two time periods: pre- and post-Justice Scalia’s ascension to the Supreme Court’s bench. This specification allowed
us to test whether the differences in citation behavior between
Democratic and Republican judges were significantly different
from one another in the pre-Scalia period against the postScalia period. The results are presented in Table A1 below.
The results in Table A1 support the main findings in the
Article. With respect to citations to floor debates or committee
hearings, the results indicate that Republican judges cited
them 7.9% less often than Democratic judges in the pre-Scalia
period. The gap widened considerably after Scalia’s appointment, with Republican judges citing them 73.6% less often
than Democratic judges. With respect to committee reports,
Republican judges cited them 16.3% less often than Democratic judges in the pre-Scalia period. After Scalia’s appointment, not only did Republican judges cite committee reports
more often than Democratic judges, but the gap was 122%.
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TABLE A1: T-TEST RESULTS: COMPARING DIFFERENCES IN
REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC JUDGES’
CITATION BEHAVIOR IN MAJORITY OPINIONS IN THE PRE- AND POSTSCALIA PERIODS

Pre-Scalia Effect
Post-Scalia Effect

R minus D
(1965-1985)
R minus D
(1986 -2011)
T-Score
p-value

Floor
Committee
Debates or Reports
Committee
Hearings
-7.93
-16.33
(21)
(21)
-73.66
121.96
(26)
(26)
14.33***
-5.572***
(1.155e-15)
(5.32e-06)

Note: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. Number of (years) are shown in parentheses. “R”
represents Republican judges and “D” represents Democratic judges.

B.
PRESIDENTIAL COHORT RESULTS
Figures B1 and B2 present the average probability scores
for citations to legislative history materials for each presidential cohort in our study. The results in Figure B1 indicate that
more recent Republican cohorts have a lower probability of
citing floor debates or committee hearings than do older Republican cohorts. Meanwhile, more recent Republican cohorts,
on average, cite committee reports more often than older Republican cohorts. As for Democratic judges, there is an increase in citations to committee reports with each succeeding
presidency, whereas for floor debates or committee hearings
there is an increase until the Clinton judges (the only postReagan Democratic cohort). It is also interesting to note the
dramatically lower rate of citations to floor debates or committee hearings among post-Reagan Republican judges.
We also performed a series of paired t-tests across Republican cohorts and across Democratic cohorts to observe correlations in citation behavior to legislative materials. Each t-test
compares one cohort of judges against another cohort of
judges. Tables B1 and B2 display the results for the paired ttests for Republican presidential cohorts. Tables B3 and B4
display the results for the paired t-tests for Democratic presidential cohorts. We highlight the statistically significant findings in each table.
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FIGURE B1: AVERAGE PROBABILITY OF CITING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
MATERIALS ACROSS REPUBLICAN COHORTS
Floor Debate or Committee Hearing

Committee Reports

0.20

0.15

0.10

----

0.05

0.00

FIGURE B2: AVERAGE PROBABILITY OF CITING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
MATERIALS ACROSS DEMOCRATIC COHORTS
Floor Debate or Committee Hearing

Committee Reports

0.20

0. 15

0.10

0.05
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TABLE B1: PAIRWISE T-TEST ON CITATIONS TO FLOOR DEBATES OR
COMMITTEE HEARINGS ACROSS REPUBLICAN COHORTS (1965–2011)
H.W. Bush
Reagan
Ford
Nixon

W. Bush
1.000
2.4e-07
1.000
3.8e-14

H.W. Bush Reagan
2.7e-07
1.000
6.8e-05
3.8e-14
0.09

Ford
5.0e-11
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TABLE B2: PAIRWISE T-TEST ON CITATIONS TO THE COMMITTEE
REPORTS ACROSS REPUBLICAN COHORTS (1965–2011)
H.W. Bush
Reagan
Ford
Nixon

W. Bush
1.000
3.9e-09
1.000
0.62

H.W. Bush Reagan
2.2e-8
1.000
2.4e-12
1.000
4.9e-05

Ford
0.02

TABLE B3: PAIRWISE T-TEST ON CITATIONS TO FLOOR DEBATES OR
COMMITTEE HEARINGS ACROSS DEMOCRATIC COHORTS
(1965–2011)
Clinton
Carter 1,8e-09
Johnson
1.000
Kennedy
0.93

Carter
7.9e-08
7.2e-12

Johnson
0.56

TABLE B4: PAIRWISE T-TEST ON CITATIONS TO THE COMMITTEE
REPORTS ACROSS DEMOCRATIC COHORTS (1965–2011)
Carter
Johnson
Kennedy

Clinton
1.000
0.0003
4.7e-05

Carter
0.0102
0.0022

Johnson
1.000

C.
CHEVRON
In 1984, the Supreme Court decided Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984),
creating a new two-step test to determine whether to accept an
agency’s legal interpretation of the statute it administers.
Given the importance of this new deference regime and the fact
that the case was decided a couple of years before the rise of
the attacks on legislative history, we test whether Chevron has
a latent relationship with the decision to cite certain types of
legislative history materials.
Prior research by Barnett and Walker analyzed published
appellate court opinions from 2003 to 2013 that cite Chevron.117 The authors found that, in opinions citing Chevron, the
court applied Chevron deference 77% of the time. We merged
117
Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116
MICH. L. REV. 1, 1 (2017).
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our data with data provided by Barnett and Walker. Table C1
presents the distribution of opinions citing a given type of legislative history material, citing Chevron, and applying Chevron.
The results in Table C1 suggest the Chevron doctrine is usually
applied when it is cited, but the percentage of cases applying
Chevron varies.
As an additional validation check for the main findings in
our Article, we compared the opinions from the time period
when our data overlaps with the Barnett and Walker study and
found the same number of opinions citing Chevron. We also
replicated our finding of significant partisan differences in the
citation behavior of judges for the specific time period of our
data that overlaps with the Barnett and Walker study
(2003–2011). These results are shown in Table C2.
Tables C3, C4, and C5 present the results of a series of
unpaired t-tests. The tests found in Table C3 include only
opinions that cite Chevron. The tests found in Table C4 include
only opinions that cite but do not apply Chevron. Finally, the
tests found in Table C5 include only opinions that cite and
apply Chevron.
Across the five sets of results we found statistically significant differences in citation behavior between Democratic and
Republican judges in opinions citing floor debates or committee
hearings. With regard to committee reports, the statistically
significant difference in citation behavior between Democratic
and Republican judges goes away when we narrow our focus to
opinions citing committee reports and citing Chevron (see Table
C3). Table C5 presents a similar finding, with no statistically
significant differences between Democratic and Republican
judges when we narrow our focus to opinions citing committee
reports and both citing and applying the Chevron doctrine.
However, when we consider opinions citing committee reports
and Chevron but not applying the Chevron doctrine, the statistically significant difference between Democratic and Republican appellate judges reappears (see Table C4).
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TABLE C1: APPLICATIONS OF Chevron in Reported Opinions by
Courts of Appeals Across Types of Legislative Materials
(2003–2011)
Type of
Legislative
History
Material

Floor Debates
or Committee
Hearings
Committee
Hearing

Number of Number of
Opinions* Opinions
Citing
Chevron+

1,891

195

212

26

Code of Federal
Regulations

17,858

2,841

U.S. Code

67,504

5,414

Number of Opinions
Citing and Applying
Chevron ++
(% of Opinions Applying
Chevron and Citing
Legislative Material)
(% of Opinions Citing
and Applying Chevron)
149
(7.87%)
(76.41%)
21
(9.90%)
(80.76%)
2,447
(13.91%)
(86.13%)
4,028
(5.96%)
(74.39%)

*Number of cases validated by Lexis Advance.
+ Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Indicated by Barnett and Walker
(2017) and Mayer Opinions.

TABLE C2: T-TEST RESULTS: COMPARING DEMOCRATIC AND
REPUBLICAN JUDGES’ CITATION BEHAVIOR IN MAJORITY OPINIONS
(2003–2011)
Floor
Committee
Debates or Reports
Committee
Hearings
T-Score
6.294***
-2.949**
(P-Value)
(0.000)
(0.012)
# of Opinions
1,891
10,478
% Authored by Rep. 12.70%
56.89%
Note: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1.
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TABLE C3: T-TEST RESULTS: COMPARING DEMOCRATIC AND
REPUBLICAN JUDGES’ CITATION BEHAVIOR IN MAJORITY OPINIONS
CITING CHEVRON (2003–2011)
Floor
Committee
Debates or Reports
Committee
Hearings
T-Score
2.089**
-1.143
(P-Value)
(0.020)
(0.279)
# of Opinions
195
1,579
% Authored by Rep.
9.74%
61.45%
Note: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1.

TABLE C4: T-TEST RESULTS: COMPARING DEMOCRATIC AND
REPUBLICAN JUDGES’ CITATION BEHAVIOR IN MAJORITY OPINIONS
CITING BUT NOT APPLYING CHEVRON (2003–2011)
Floor
Committee
Debates or Reports
Committee
Hearings
T-Score
4.894***
-2.223**
(P-Value)
(0.000)
(0.044)
# of Opinions
46
205
% Authored by Rep.
8.69%
65.36%
Note: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1.

TABLE C5: T-TEST RESULTS: COMPARING DEMOCRATIC AND
REPUBLICAN JUDGES’ CITATION BEHAVIOR IN MAJORITY OPINIONS
CITING AND APPLYING CHEVRON (2003–2011)
Floor
Committee
Debates or Reports
Committee
Hearings
T-Score
4.088***
-0.922
(P-Value)
(0.001)
(0.377)
# of Opinions
149
1,374
% Authored by Rep.
8.05%
59.75%
Note: ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1.
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